---
title: "Why football clubs never make money"
url: https://modern-mba.com/case/football-clubs
sector: "Media & entertainment"
sector_url: https://modern-mba.com/sector/media-and-entertainment
published: 2022-12-17
updated: 2026-09-02
reading_time_minutes: 12
charts: 8
video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s7N-xXGgdE4
publisher: Modern MBA
license: All rights reserved. Quote with attribution and a link.
---

# Why football clubs never make money

The biggest football clubs look like thriving international brands: sold-out stadiums, billion-pound sponsorships, fans who buy a new jersey every season. They are also barely cash flow positive and structurally unprofitable, because every pound of new revenue is claimed in advance by the wages required to keep winning. This case study reads Manchester United, Juventus and Barcelona to show why success on the pitch and profit on the balance sheet pull against each other — and why the end state is a billionaire's passion project.

## Key figures

- **80–90%** — Share of Barcelona's revenue spent on player wages, eight seasons running
- **€250M** — Juventus's 2021 loss, the largest by an Italian club in history
- **25 yrs** — Of future broadcast income Barcelona sold off to raise cash

## The argument

The business looks like it should work. A club wins, the brand strengthens, the fanbase grows, and tickets, sponsorship, broadcast money and merchandise all follow. Manchester United has run that flywheel better than anyone alive — revenue tripled from £280 million in 2009 to nearly £600 million by 2022, with commercial income alone quadrupling to £260 million. It is the best-case demonstration of how far the model goes.

It still does not clear the wage bill. Player salaries are the largest expense at every club and they grow in line with revenue and from a higher base, so the flywheel funds the thing that consumes it. Barcelona is the extreme: player compensation went from €400 million in 2014 to nearly €700 million by 2021, and for eight straight seasons 80 to 90% of everything the club earned went to paying players — forcing it to sell 25 years of future broadcast income to keep the lights on. Juventus lost €250 million in 2021, the largest loss in Italian football history, and is now under criminal investigation for allegedly understating it.

The trap is that neither direction is survivable. Cut wages and the team declines, fans disengage, and sponsors pay less for a losing brand. Keep paying and you lose money forever. Manchester United's answer was to stop pretending — finishing outside the top four five times in ten years while paying its owners dividends, because commercial contracts are signed years ahead and pay out regardless of results. Which leaves one stable ownership model: a billionaire who never needed it to be a business.

## Charts

### The flywheel works exactly as advertised

Revenue by stream. Commercial income quadrupled to £258M and held through two crowdless seasons, because sponsorships are signed years ahead.

|  | Matchday | Broadcast | Commercial |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 2009 | £114M | £98M | £65M |
| 2010 | £106M | £103M | £77M |
| 2011 | £111M | £117M | £103M |
| 2012 | £99M | £104M | £118M |
| 2013 | £109M | £102M | £152M |
| 2014 | £108M | £136M | £189M |
| 2015 | £91M | £108M | £197M |
| 2016 | £107M | £140M | £268M |
| 2017 | £112M | £194M | £276M |
| 2018 | £110M | £204M | £276M |
| 2019 | £111M | £241M | £275M |
| 2020 | £90M | £140M | £279M |
| 2021 | £7M | £254M | £232M |
| 2022 | £111M | £215M | £258M |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why football clubs never make money”, published December 2022. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/football-clubs#chart-1 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/football-clubs#sources

### And it still does not reach the bottom line

Manchester United revenue against profit. Revenue doubled across the window; the club lost money in six of the fourteen years and £116M in the last one.

|  | Revenue | Profit / loss |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2009 | £278M | £5M |
| 2010 | £286M | −£48M |
| 2011 | £331M | £13M |
| 2012 | £320M | £23M |
| 2013 | £363M | £146M |
| 2014 | £433M | £24M |
| 2015 | £395M | −£1M |
| 2016 | £515M | £36M |
| 2017 | £581M | £39M |
| 2018 | £589M | −£37M |
| 2019 | £627M | £19M |
| 2020 | £509M | −£23M |
| 2021 | £494M | −£92M |
| 2022 | £583M | −£116M |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why football clubs never make money”, published December 2022. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/football-clubs#chart-2 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/football-clubs#sources

### The best commercial operation in football does not cover its wages

Commercial revenue against player salaries. Sponsorship quadrupled to £258M; the wage bill went past it in 2009 and has never come back under.

|  | Commercial revenue | Player salaries |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2009 | £65M | −£123M |
| 2010 | £77M | −£132M |
| 2011 | £103M | −£153M |
| 2012 | £118M | −£162M |
| 2013 | £152M | −£181M |
| 2014 | £189M | −£215M |
| 2015 | £197M | −£203M |
| 2016 | £268M | −£232M |
| 2017 | £276M | −£263M |
| 2018 | £276M | −£296M |
| 2019 | £275M | −£332M |
| 2020 | £279M | −£284M |
| 2021 | £232M | −£323M |
| 2022 | £258M | −£384M |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why football clubs never make money”, published December 2022. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/football-clubs#chart-3 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/football-clubs#sources

### Barcelona spent nearly everything it earned on players

Core revenue against player compensation. From 2014 the wage bill runs at 80 to 90% of income, and in 2020 it exceeds income entirely.

|  | Core revenue | Player compensation |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2009 | €376M | −€235M |
| 2010 | €427M | −€244M |
| 2011 | €456M | −€237M |
| 2012 | €460M | −€245M |
| 2013 | €458M | −€254M |
| 2014 | €537M | −€419M |
| 2015 | €594M | −€435M |
| 2016 | €617M | −€432M |
| 2017 | €686M | −€639M |
| 2018 | €835M | −€671M |
| 2019 | €708M | −€636M |
| 2020 | €575M | −€617M |
| 2021 | €627M | −€518M |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why football clubs never make money”, published December 2022. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/football-clubs#chart-4 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/football-clubs#sources

### The first club past a billion, and it lost €481M getting there

Revenue against profit. Eleven thin years, a €481M loss in 2020, then a paper recovery built on selling future broadcast income.

|  | Revenue | Profit / loss |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2009 | €415M | −€80M |
| 2010 | €473M | −€9M |
| 2011 | €495M | €49M |
| 2012 | €490M | €32M |
| 2013 | €530M | €41M |
| 2014 | €608M | €41M |
| 2015 | €679M | €15M |
| 2016 | €708M | €29M |
| 2017 | €914M | €18M |
| 2018 | €990M | €5M |
| 2019 | €855M | −€97M |
| 2020 | €631M | −€481M |
| 2021 | €1,019M | €98M |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why football clubs never make money”, published December 2022. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/football-clubs#chart-5 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/football-clubs#sources

### Juventus runs the identical gap on a third the money

Commercial revenue against player compensation. Sponsorship more than tripled to €166M and the wage bill was double it for the whole thirteen years.

|  | Commercial revenue | Player compensation |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2009 | €46M | −€127M |
| 2010 | €43M | −€127M |
| 2011 | €53M | −€137M |
| 2012 | €53M | −€149M |
| 2013 | €60M | −€167M |
| 2014 | €54M | −€178M |
| 2015 | €83M | −€197M |
| 2016 | €93M | −€235M |
| 2017 | €113M | −€233M |
| 2018 | €152M | −€301M |
| 2019 | €160M | −€259M |
| 2020 | €170M | −€298M |
| 2021 | €166M | −€325M |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why football clubs never make money”, published December 2022. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/football-clubs#chart-6 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/football-clubs#sources

### Juventus doubled revenue into the largest loss in Italian football

Revenue against profit. Juventus grew from €220M to €621M and its losses grew faster, reaching €253M in 2021.

|  | Revenue | Profit / loss |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2009 | €220M | −€11M |
| 2010 | €172M | −€95M |
| 2011 | €213M | −€49M |
| 2012 | €284M | −€15M |
| 2013 | €316M | −€1M |
| 2014 | €348M | €1M |
| 2015 | €387M | €4M |
| 2016 | €562M | €42M |
| 2017 | €504M | −€19M |
| 2018 | €621M | −€39M |
| 2019 | €573M | −€89M |
| 2020 | €479M | −€209M |
| 2021 | €439M | −€253M |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why football clubs never make money”, published December 2022. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/football-clubs#chart-7 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/football-clubs#sources

### The one model that works is not needing it to

Revenue against operating profit. Trophies every season, a profit in two years of nine, and an owner who absorbs the difference.

|  | Revenue | Operating profit / loss |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2013 | £416M | −£18M |
| 2014 | £463M | £2M |
| 2015 | £525M | £3M |
| 2016 | £528M | −£30M |
| 2017 | £568M | −£22M |
| 2018 | £611M | −£22M |
| 2019 | £549M | −£160M |
| 2020 | £645M | −£59M |
| 2021 | £613M | −£21M |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why football clubs never make money”, published December 2022. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/football-clubs#chart-8 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/football-clubs#sources


## Takeaways

1. The audience is the largest in sport and it is not close. The **Premier League** is broadcast to over **200 countries** and watched by more than **3 billion people** — level with the World Cup, except it happens **every year** rather than every four. The **Super Bowl** peaks around **100 million**.
2. **Manchester United is the best-case demonstration of the model**, and it has been run for investors rather than fans for over a decade — paying owners tens of millions in dividends while the team underperformed. Critics call it a commercial club rather than a football club, which is why it shows the ceiling so clearly.
3. It worked on the top line: revenue **tripled from £280M in 2009 to nearly £600M by 2022**.
4. **Matchday income has quietly stopped mattering.** Tickets, food and drink were **41% of revenue in 2009** and are now **under 20%** — never exceeding **£114M** or falling below **£90M** in a year, despite Old Trafford being **England's second-largest stadium at 70,000 seats**. There is a hard ceiling on how many people you can physically sell to.
5. **Broadcast money doubled** from **£100M to £250M**, holding around **34%** of revenue — and it is negotiated by the league, not the club. **Sky paid £2.3 billion in 2013** for 116 of 380 games, then **£3.75 billion in 2021** for 128. Every club's share is guaranteed by simply not being relegated.
6. **Commercial revenue is where United genuinely outperformed everyone**, quadrupling from **£65M to £260M** and going from **24% to 44%** of revenue. Sponsors pay to be associated with the club regardless of industry — airlines, drinks, cars, watches.
7. The jersey alone shows the escalation: **Vodafone at £8M a year**, then **AIG at £14M**, then **Aon at £90M over four years**, then **General Motors at $70M in year one rising 2.1% annually for eight**, and now **TeamViewer at £235M over five years**. United popularized selling the **sleeve** separately in 2009.
8. Supplier deals escalated the same way. When **Arsenal** signed a record **£150M over five years with Puma**, United answered months later with **£750M over ten years from Adidas** — and the club's real skill is manufacturing the bidding war that produces those numbers.
9. **The same logo space is sold more than once.** Sponsors are segmented by geography, so Saudi Telecom, Smirnoff, Honda and Telekom Malaysia could appear in Eastern markets while different brands ran in the West. United went from **12 global sponsors** in 2009 to **over 20 plus dozens of regional deals** by 2022, in categories as unlikely as bathroom fixtures and crackers.
10. **Commercial money is the good revenue precisely because it ignores results.** Deals are large, guaranteed, locked in for years, and carry almost no variable cost once signed — unlike matchday or broadcast income, which move with performance.
11. **The proof is what happened when the team collapsed.** United finished outside the top four **five times in ten years**. In **2013 it finished 7th, its worst ever — and commercial revenue rose from £120M to £152M.** Across the 5th and 6th place seasons of 2015 and 2016 it leapt from **£195M to £268M** on the Adidas deal. **TeamViewer's stock has since crashed and it cannot exit.**
12. **And none of it covers the wages.** Player and staff salaries are the largest expense at every club, and while commercial revenue grew **12% a year**, salaries grew in line and **from a higher base** — so the Adidas deal, the TeamViewer deal and a **£24M-a-year training kit sponsor** together still do not pay the squad.
13. **Barcelona ran the same playbook without the discipline.** Chasing marquee signings to satisfy a fanbase produced bloated contracts, above-market salaries and enormous transfer fees; player compensation went from **€400M in 2014 to nearly €700M by 2021**, consuming **80 to 90% of all revenue for eight consecutive seasons** and forcing the club into debt to operate.
14. **So it sold the future.** Barcelona liquidated **25 years of broadcast rights** and other businesses for cash, then became the first club to pass **€1 billion in sales** in 2021 — a figure largely produced by that liquidation rather than by the business working.
15. The fanbase is not the constraint, which is the uncomfortable part. At a Champions League match, **VIP seats went for €1,950**, home jerseys had been **sold out for months** at **€90-120**, and the ground was full at **€100-plus** a seat — and Barcelona still lost **3-0 to Bayern Munich with zero shots on goal**. **There is no plausible number of €25 scarves that covers half a billion in wages.**
16. **Juventus shows where the pressure goes.** It lost **€250 million in 2021**, the largest loss in the history of Italian football, and is under criminal investigation for false accounting — prosecutors allege under-the-table payments to suppress reported salaries and inflated valuations on player sales. **Manchester United does not face that particular temptation because it does not book player sales as revenue.**

## Common questions

### Do football clubs actually make money?

Almost none of them do. They are barely cash flow positive and structurally unprofitable, because player wages — the largest expense at every club — grow in line with revenue and from a higher base. Manchester United tripled revenue to nearly £600 million and still cannot cover its squad from commercial income. Barcelona spends 80–90% of everything it earns on player wages. Juventus lost €250 million in 2021. Clubs sustain this by hoping future success pays for today's costs, or by treating the club as an asset to flip on appreciation rather than a business to run at a profit.

### How do football clubs make money?

Three streams. Matchday revenue is tickets, food and drink at home games — historically the core, now under 20% of Manchester United's revenue and effectively capped by stadium size. Broadcast revenue is negotiated by the league and split among clubs, worth around 34% and guaranteed as long as you avoid relegation. Commercial revenue is private sponsorship deals, and it is both the fastest growing and the best quality: large, locked in for years, paid regardless of results, and carrying almost no cost to collect once signed.

### Why is Barcelona in so much financial trouble?

Because it spent to satisfy expectations rather than to a budget. Chasing marquee signings produced bloated contracts, above-market salaries and enormous transfer fees, taking player compensation from €400 million in 2014 to nearly €700 million by 2021. For eight straight seasons, 80 to 90% of all revenue went to paying players, forcing the club into debt to cover ordinary operations. It then sold 25 years of future broadcast rights and other business assets to raise cash — which is most of why it became the first club to report over €1 billion in sales.

### Why did Manchester United's sponsorship income grow while the team played badly?

Because commercial deals are signed years in advance and pay out regardless of results. United finished outside the top four five times in ten years, and in 2013 recorded its worst-ever 7th place finish — the same year commercial revenue rose from £120 million to £152 million. Across the 5th and 6th place seasons of 2015 and 2016 it went from £195 million to £268 million on the Adidas deal. TeamViewer, whose stock has since crashed, cannot exit its £235 million agreement.

### How much do football shirt sponsorships cost?

They have escalated enormously. Manchester United's jersey went from Vodafone at £8 million a year in the 2000s, to AIG at £14 million, to Aon at £90 million over four years, to General Motors at $70 million in the first year rising 2.1% annually for eight, to TeamViewer at £235 million over five years. Kit supply is larger still: Arsenal's record £150 million five-year Puma deal was beaten months later by United's £750 million ten-year agreement with Adidas. The sleeve is sold separately — a practice United popularized in 2009.

### Why is Juventus under criminal investigation?

For false accounting. Prosecutors allege the club's losses are significantly larger than reported, that it made under-the-table payments to players so salaries would appear lower on the books, and that it inflated the values of players it sold to make the business look healthier. The reported 2021 loss of €250 million is already the largest in Italian football history. The player-sale element is specific to clubs that book those sales as revenue — Manchester United does not, which removes that particular temptation.

### Can football clubs just charge fans more?

They are already close to the ceiling. At a Champions League match at Camp Nou, VIP seats sold for €1,950, ordinary seats went for over €100, home jerseys had been sold out for months at €90–120, and the stadium was full of supporters carrying licensed merchandise. Consumption was visibly near capacity — and the club still lost 3-0 with zero shots on goal. There is no realistic number of €25 scarves and €10 mugs that offsets half a billion in player wages.

### What is the European Super League actually for?

Revenue concentration. The core club business model cannot generate enough profit, and the only meaningful lever left is playing more high-profile, high-viewership matches that unlock more broadcast money and sponsorship. A closed competition of 20 elite clubs means fewer parties splitting the pot — where domestic and continental broadcast revenue today is diluted across giants, mid-table clubs and minnows alike. It keeps resurfacing because the economic pressure that produces it never goes away.

## Discussion

- Manchester United's commercial revenue rose in its worst season on the pitch. If sponsors pay regardless of results, what exactly are they buying — and how long can that hold?
- Cut wages and the team declines; keep paying and you lose money forever. Is there a version of this business with a stable equilibrium, or is unprofitability structural to competitive sport?
- Barcelona sold 25 years of broadcast income to fund today's squad. When is mortgaging the future defensible, and what would have to be true for that trade to work?
- The fanbase is spending at capacity — sold-out jerseys, €1,950 seats, full stadiums — and it still is not enough. What does that say about the ceiling on monetizing a sports audience?
- If only billionaire-funded clubs can compete, is the Super League an obvious solution to a real economic problem, or the problem finally admitting what it is?

## Sources

Revenue by stream, commercial and broadcast growth, player wage totals and operating losses from Manchester United plc, Juventus FC and FC Barcelona annual reports and financial statements, 2009 through 2022; sponsorship and kit supplier deal values as announced by the clubs; Premier League broadcast rights values as reported at auction; the Juventus false accounting investigation as reported by Italian prosecutors; matchday pricing observed on location at Camp Nou

---

From [Modern MBA](https://modern-mba.com/). Read this case in full at [https://modern-mba.com/case/football-clubs](https://modern-mba.com/case/football-clubs), or watch the episode at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s7N-xXGgdE4.