---
title: "Why nobody wants to own ice cream anymore"
url: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream
sector: "Food & beverage"
sector_url: https://modern-mba.com/sector/food-and-beverage
aired: 2024-10-27
published: 2026-08-26
updated: 2026-08-28
reading_time_minutes: 16
charts: 19
video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oZuz9AHe9JA
author: "Yishan Lin"
author_url: https://www.linkedin.com/in/yishanlin/
publisher: Modern MBA
license: "© Modern MBA, all rights reserved. Quote and cite with credit and a link; republishing needs written permission."
---

# Why nobody wants to own ice cream anymore

Unilever, Nestlé, and Kroger between them owned Ben & Jerry's, Häagen-Dazs, Breyers, Klondike, Magnum, Good Humor, Dreyer's, Drumstick, and Turkey Hill. All three have concluded that ice cream is not worth owning — Nestlé sold at a discount in 2019, Kroger dumped Turkey Hill for half its revenue the same year, and Unilever has been trying to give away the world's largest ice cream business since 2024. This case study reads their accounts to work out why, then films three New York independents to see what actually works at the other end of the market.

## Key figures

- **4% in 20 years** — Growth of the world's largest ice cream business
- **16oz → 14oz** — Häagen-Dazs pint in 2009, at the same price
- **$500M → $215M** — Turkey Hill's revenue, and what Kroger sold it for

## The argument

On paper ice cream is the easiest business in packaged food. It is frozen, takes few inputs, scales into enormous quantities, and has decades of proven distribution behind it. Switching costs are zero, so a good product can take share in a single trip to the freezer aisle. It is never a question of whether someone eats ice cream, only when.

And every conglomerate that owned it has quit. Unilever assembled the largest ice cream business on earth and grew it 4% in twenty years, blaming the weather every one of them. Nestlé sold Häagen-Dazs, Dreyer's, and Drumstick for $4 billion — after margins that had only improved because it cut the pint from 16 ounces to 14 and charged the same. Kroger owned Turkey Hill for forty years, doing $500 million a year, and sold it for $215 million.

Which makes the private equity money pouring into Van Leeuwen, Jeni's, and Salt & Straw hard to explain. These are single-product companies with none of the shared manufacturing or scale that got the conglomerates to double digits — and double digits is the ceiling here, not the target. The three New York independents found the only answers that work: fry it and sell it at street fairs, build a brand the incumbents ignore, or skip consumers entirely and sell to 400 restaurants.

## Charts

### The freezer aisle your parents bought from

Sales of the top eight ice cream brands in the United States, 2023, in millions. Five of the eight are or were owned by two conglomerates.

|  | US dollars |
| --- | --- |
| Ben & Jerry's | $951M |
| Häagen-Dazs | $802M |
| Blue Bell | $719M |
| Breyers | $546M |
| Dreyer's | $546M |
| Tillamook | $324M |
| Turkey Hill | $248M |
| Talenti | $209M |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why nobody wants to own ice cream anymore”, aired October 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#chart-1 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#sources

### It was never a good business on its own

Ben & Jerry's operating margin as an independent, through the decade its cultural profile peaked.

|  | Percentages |
| --- | --- |
| 1991 | 7% |
| 1992 | 9% |
| 1993 | 9% |
| 1994 | −3% |
| 1995 | 6% |
| 1996 | 4% |
| 1997 | 4% |
| 1998 | 5% |
| 1999 | 2% |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why nobody wants to own ice cream anymore”, aired October 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#chart-2 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#sources

### Twenty years, four percent

Unilever ice cream division revenue, in millions. The largest ice cream business on earth, in a category everybody buys.

|  | US dollars |
| --- | --- |
| 2001 | $8,422M |
| 2002 | $8,127M |
| 2003 | $7,623M |
| 2004 | $7,045M |
| 2005 | $6,947M |
| 2006 | $8,284M |
| 2007 | $8,386M |
| 2020 | $7,194M |
| 2021 | $7,521M |
| 2022 | $8,611M |
| 2023 | $8,611M |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why nobody wants to own ice cream anymore”, aired October 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#chart-3 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#sources

### The synergies never arrived

Unilever's ice cream operating margin against the company's overall margin. From 2010 it underperformed nearly every year.

|  | Ice cream | Whole company |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2001 | 6% | 7% |
| 2003 | 15% | 10% |
| 2005 | 12% | 12% |
| 2007 | 11% | 13% |
| 2010 | 8% | 14% |
| 2011 | 8% | 13% |
| 2013 | 9% | 14% |
| 2015 | 8% | 14% |
| 2017 | 16% | 15% |
| 2019 | 15% | 16% |
| 2021 | 11% | 16% |
| 2023 | 10% | 16% |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why nobody wants to own ice cream anymore”, aired October 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#chart-4 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#sources

### The weakest link at Unilever

Operating margin of every product division at Unilever, 2020 against 2023. Every euro in ice cream is a euro not in Dove or Knorr.

|  | 2020 | 2023 |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Ice cream | 5% | 10% |
| Beauty | 19% | 19% |
| Personal care | 23% | 20% |
| Home care | 12% | 12% |
| Nutrition | 16% | 18% |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why nobody wants to own ice cream anymore”, aired October 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#chart-5 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#sources

### Nestlé ran the same play and got the same answer

Nestlé ice cream division revenue, in millions. It peaked in 2007 and fell every year after.

|  | US dollars |
| --- | --- |
| 1999 | $4,147M |
| 2001 | $4,416M |
| 2003 | $4,373M |
| 2005 | $8,147M |
| 2007 | $8,724M |
| 2010 | $5,812M |
| 2011 | $5,169M |
| 2013 | $4,776M |
| 2015 | $4,583M |
| 2018 | $3,144M |
| 2019 | $3,289M |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why nobody wants to own ice cream anymore”, aired October 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#chart-6 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#sources

### The margin step change is 2009

Nestlé ice cream operating margin. The year the Häagen-Dazs pint went from 16 ounces to 14 at the same price.

|  | Percentages |
| --- | --- |
| 1999 | 11% |
| 2000 | 12% |
| 2001 | 11% |
| 2003 | 12% |
| 2004 | 12% |
| 2005 | 11% |
| 2007 | 12% |
| 2010 | 14% |
| 2011 | 14% |
| 2012 | 15% |
| 2014 | 15% |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why nobody wants to own ice cream anymore”, aired October 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#chart-7 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#sources

### What the brands actually change hands for

High-profile ice cream deals: annual revenue at the time against the price paid. Turkey Hill sold for less than half a year's sales.

|  | Revenue | Acquisition price |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Häagen-Dazs | $237M | $326M |
| Talenti | $120M | $350M |
| Turkey Hill | $500M | $215M |
| Froneri | $1,800M | $4,000M |
| Dippin' Dots | $100M | $222M |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why nobody wants to own ice cream anymore”, aired October 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#chart-8 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#sources

### The pure play grows only by buying

Froneri revenue, in millions. Every increase came from acquisition rather than from volume.

|  | US dollars |
| --- | --- |
| 2019 | $2,631M |
| 2020 | $3,973M |
| 2021 | $4,240M |
| 2022 | $5,074M |
| 2023 | $5,292M |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why nobody wants to own ice cream anymore”, aired October 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#chart-9 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#sources

### Every dollar of profit goes to the lenders

Froneri operating income against financing costs and interest payments, in millions. It loses more than it makes, every year.

|  | Operating income | Financing costs |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2019 | $214M | −$193M |
| 2020 | $276M | −$383M |
| 2021 | $233M | −$392M |
| 2022 | $413M | −$448M |
| 2023 | $530M | −$586M |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why nobody wants to own ice cream anymore”, aired October 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#chart-10 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#sources

### The scoop shops peaked in 2008

Cold Stone Creamery locations in the United States. Franchising took it from 225 to 1,375, and it has shrunk ever since.

|  | Counts |
| --- | --- |
| 2001 | 225 |
| 2005 | 900 |
| 2008 | 1,375 |
| 2010 | 1,300 |
| 2011 | 1,100 |
| 2015 | 1,253 |
| 2020 | 882 |
| 2021 | 894 |
| 2022 | 812 |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why nobody wants to own ice cream anymore”, aired October 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#chart-11 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#sources

### You spend a year's revenue to buy a year's revenue

Cost to open a Cold Stone franchise against annual median revenue by chain, from official franchise disclosure documents.

|  | US dollars |
| --- | --- |
| Cost to open | −$584,000 |
| Cold Stone | $531,000 |
| Dairy Queen | $1,386,549 |
| Baskin Robbins | $462,121 |
| Handel's | $794,620 |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why nobody wants to own ice cream anymore”, aired October 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#chart-12 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#sources

### Eight percent in twelve years

Baskin Robbins systemwide sales in the United States, in millions. Most of the growth is recovering ground lost in the first five years.

|  | US dollars |
| --- | --- |
| 2007 | $572M |
| 2008 | $560M |
| 2009 | $530M |
| 2010 | $501M |
| 2011 | $509M |
| 2012 | $528M |
| 2013 | $531M |
| 2014 | $561M |
| 2015 | $595M |
| 2016 | $604M |
| 2017 | $606M |
| 2018 | $612M |
| 2019 | $615M |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why nobody wants to own ice cream anymore”, aired October 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#chart-13 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#sources

### Even the bright spot is sluggish

Baskin Robbins average annual sales per international location. Up 14% across twelve years, and below the 2011 peak.

|  | US dollars |
| --- | --- |
| 2007 | $232,401 |
| 2009 | $269,804 |
| 2011 | $305,027 |
| 2013 | $280,764 |
| 2015 | $250,788 |
| 2017 | $248,654 |
| 2019 | $265,543 |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why nobody wants to own ice cream anymore”, aired October 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#chart-14 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#sources

### And private equity keeps buying in anyway

Investment by private equity and venture capital into emerging ice cream brands, in millions.

|  | US dollars |
| --- | --- |
| Van Leeuwen | $25M |
| Oberweis | $20M |
| Ample Hills | $19M |
| Jeni's | $15M |
| Salt & Straw | $4M |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why nobody wants to own ice cream anymore”, aired October 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#chart-15 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#sources

### What three New York independents actually gross

Annual revenue, against the median franchise store. il Laboratorio's number is wholesale plus retail combined.

|  | US dollars |
| --- | --- |
| il Laboratorio | $2,780,000 |
| Smoove | $500,000 |
| Sam's | $201,000 |
| Cold Stone | $531,000 |
| Baskin Robbins | $462,121 |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why nobody wants to own ice cream anymore”, aired October 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#chart-16 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#sources

### Without the restaurants, it is a small business

Sales of il Laboratorio's former Greenwich Village location, now closed, against the other independents and the franchise median.

|  | US dollars |
| --- | --- |
| il Laboratorio | $324,000 |
| Smoove | $500,000 |
| Sam's | $201,000 |
| Baskin Robbins | $462,121 |
| Cold Stone | $531,000 |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why nobody wants to own ice cream anymore”, aired October 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#chart-17 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#sources

### Every other food concept earns more per dollar

Annual operating margin against big brands and other independent concepts covered on this channel.

|  | Percentages |
| --- | --- |
| il Laboratorio wholesale | 10% |
| il Laboratorio retail | 9% |
| Smoove | 13% |
| Ben & Jerry's | 10% |
| Häagen-Dazs | 10% |
| Hey Hey | 20% |
| Odd One Out | 35% |
| 7 Miles | 30% |
| Los Gatos Tacos | 20% |
| Mid East Tacos | 24% |
| Mikiko | 40% |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why nobody wants to own ice cream anymore”, aired October 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#chart-18 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#sources

### A restaurant is worth forty-five walk-ins

Average customer spend, against other concepts covered on this channel. The wholesale figure is monthly; the rest are per visit.

|  | US dollars |
| --- | --- |
| il Laboratorio wholesale | $550 |
| il Laboratorio retail | $12 |
| Sam's | $10 |
| Smoove | $10 |
| Hey Hey | $11 |
| Odd One Out | $14 |
| 7 Miles | $9 |
| Los Gatos Tacos | $13 |
| Mikiko | $15 |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why nobody wants to own ice cream anymore”, aired October 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#chart-19 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream#sources


## Takeaways

1. **Ben & Jerry's** was never a good business on its own, which is the part the brand story leaves out. As an independent through the 1990s its operating margin ran **7%**, **9%**, **9%**, **−3%**, **6%**, **4%**, **4%**, **5%**, and **2%** — through the exact decade its cultural profile peaked. Popularity and profitability were never the same problem.
2. Twenty years later the top line has not moved. **$8,422M**, **$8,127M**, **$7,623M**, **$7,045M**, **$6,947M**, **$8,284M**, **$8,386M** through 2007, then **$7,194M**, **$7,521M**, **$8,611M**, **$8,611M** by 2023. Roughly **4%** of growth across two decades in a category everybody on earth buys.
3. Set against the other divisions it is not close. In 2023 **Unilever** ran **10%** in ice cream against **19%** in beauty, **20%** in personal care, **12%** in home care, and **18%** in nutrition — and in 2022 nutrition hit **32%** while ice cream managed **10%**. Every euro invested in ice cream was a euro not invested in **Dove**, **Axe**, **Knorr**, or **Hellmann's**.
4. Management blamed the weather for twenty years. Weak summers, cold seasons, the rising cost of sugar, dairy, and cocoa — every year, the same explanations, on a sample size long enough to rule all of them out. **Unilever** committed to selling the entire ice cream business by 2025 and has struggled to find a buyer.
5. Its margins did improve — through shrinkflation. **Nestlé's** ice cream margin ran **11%**, **12%**, **11%**, **12%**, **12%**, **11%**, **12%** and then stepped to **14%**, **14%**, **15%**, **15%** from 2010. The step change is 2009, the year it cut every **Häagen-Dazs** pint from **16 ounces** to **14** and charged the same price for it.
6. Then it left. In 2019 **Nestlé** sold the division to Parisian private equity at a **20%** premium for **$4 billion**, citing a desire to focus on high-growth verticals. Owning the second-best-selling ice cream brand in America did not qualify.
7. **Kroger** had owned **Turkey Hill** for four decades and it was the seventh best-selling brand in the country. The largest supermarket chain in America, with distribution and shelf space nobody else had, decided the ice cream business was not worth keeping either.
8. The pure-play vehicle was supposed to prove the conglomerates wrong. **Froneri** does nothing but ice cream and it has grown the top line — **$2,631M**, **$3,973M**, **$4,240M**, **$5,074M**, **$5,292M** — entirely through continuous acquisition, with no change in volume.
9. And the debt eats all of it. **Froneri's** operating income against its financing costs: **$214M** against **−$193M**, **$276M** against **−$383M**, **$233M** against **−$392M**, **$413M** against **−$448M**, **$530M** against **−$586M**. It has borrowed so heavily to fund the acquisitions that every dollar of operating profit and more goes to interest. The private equity partner is now looking for its own way out.
10. The franchise disclosures explain why nobody is opening one. It costs **$584,000** to open a **Cold Stone** and the median store grosses **$531,000** a year after royalties — against **$1,386,549** at **Dairy Queen**, **$794,620** at **Handel's**, and **$462,121** at **Baskin Robbins**. You spend more than a year's revenue to buy a year's revenue.
11. **Baskin Robbins** only survives by riding another brand. Its owner also owns **Dunkin'**, and bundling the scoop shop into the donut chain is the only way it has held US distribution — **2,763** points in 2007 against **2,524** in 2019. It has fewer American shops now than a decade ago.
12. None of which has stopped private equity. **Van Leeuwen** has taken **$25M**, **Oberweis** **$20M**, **Ample Hills** **$19M**, **Jeni's** **$15M**, and **Salt & Straw** **$4M** to scale production, blanket retailers with pints, and open scoop shops — all on the bet that one becomes the **Häagen-Dazs** of the next generation.
13. The structural problem is that they cannot even reach the ceiling the conglomerates hit. These are single-product businesses with no shared manufacturing, no cross-sell, no distribution leverage, and no adjacent categories — the exact things that got **Unilever** and **Nestlé** to double digits in the first place. It has happened before: **Ample Hills**, **Milkmade**, and **Phin & Phebes** all imploded under outside capital in the 2010s Brooklyn wave.
14. The shop is barely the business. It grosses **$15,000** a month in summer and as little as **$4,000** in the other three seasons — **$81,000** a year against **$36,000** of rent. The money is at street fairs: over a hundred of them across the Northeast, **50,000** people a night, ten orders a minute, **$2,000** in an evening against **$500** on the shop's best day. Fairs bring **$120,000** a year, for **$201,000** combined.
15. His customers are chefs. He is the exclusive supplier to nearly **400** Manhattan restaurants including **Minetta Tavern** and **Porterhouse**, who buy in gallons and turn it into their own desserts sold year-round — which removes the seasonality that defines everybody else in this business. The average wholesale customer spends **$550** a month; the average retail customer spends **$12** a visit.
16. Which is why the one number that breaks the pattern is a wholesale one. A restaurant spending **$550** a month beats a walk-in spending **$12** by a factor of forty-five, all year, without a summer. Jon's moat is not a recipe — it is that he does every job himself, keeps inventory in a shorthand only he can read, and offers free delivery, no minimum order, and midnight cut-offs that nobody with a normal org chart could match.

## Common questions

### Why is Unilever selling its ice cream business?

Because it has not grown in twenty years and it drags on the company's margins. Unilever's ice cream division went from roughly €7.6 billion at the start of the 2000s to €7.9 billion in 2023 — about 4% of growth across two decades — while running a 10% operating margin in 2023 against 19% in beauty, 20% in personal care, and 18% in nutrition. Management blamed weak summers and the cost of sugar, dairy, and cocoa every year for twenty years. It began reporting ice cream as a standalone division specifically to show investors why it wants out, committed to divesting by 2025, and has struggled to find a buyer for the largest ice cream business in the world.

### Is an ice cream shop profitable?

Marginally, and only if you solve seasonality. The three New York independents in this episode run 9% to 13% operating margins. Smoove grosses $500,000 a year at 13%, swinging between 10% in winter and 15% in summer. il Laboratorio del Gelato runs 10% on wholesale and 9% on retail. Sam's Fried Ice Cream grosses $81,000 from the shop and $120,000 from street fairs. For comparison, other independent food concepts covered on this channel run 20% to 40%. The franchise route is worse: opening a Cold Stone costs $584,000 and the median store grosses $531,000 a year.

### Did Häagen-Dazs shrink its pints?

Yes, in 2009, from 16 ounces to 14 at the same price. It is visible in Nestlé's accounts: the ice cream division's operating margin sat at 11–12% through the 2000s and stepped up to 14–15% from 2010 onwards. Revenue was falling the whole time — from a 2007 peak of $8,724 million down to $3,289 million by 2019 — so the margin improvement came from selling less product for the same money rather than from selling more.

### Who owns Ben & Jerry's and Häagen-Dazs?

Unilever bought Ben & Jerry's in 2000 and still owns it, though it has committed to divesting its entire ice cream business. Häagen-Dazs was bought by Nestlé, which sold its ice cream division — Häagen-Dazs, Dreyer's, Drumstick, and Dibs — to Froneri, a joint venture with Paris-based private equity, for $4 billion in 2019. Froneri now has that portfolio plus its own acquisitions, tops out at a 10% operating margin, and pays more in interest on its acquisition debt than it earns in operating income.

### Why is private equity investing in Van Leeuwen and Jeni's?

On the bet that one becomes the Häagen-Dazs of the next generation. Van Leeuwen has taken $25 million, Oberweis $20 million, Ample Hills $19 million, Jeni's $15 million, and Salt & Straw $4 million to scale production, open shops, and get pints into retailers. The problem is structural: these are single-product companies with none of the shared manufacturing, unified distribution, cross-sell, or adjacent categories that got Unilever and Nestlé to double-digit margins — and double digits is the ceiling in this category, not the target. It has failed before: Ample Hills, Milkmade, and Phin & Phebes all imploded under outside capital in the 2010s.

### Why did Kroger sell Turkey Hill?

For the same reason as everyone else — it decided the category was not worth the shelf it occupied. Kroger had owned Turkey Hill for four decades, it was the seventh best-selling ice cream brand in the United States, and it grossed $500 million a year. Kroger sold it to private equity in 2019 for $215 million, less than half its annual revenue. When the largest supermarket chain in America cannot make ice cream worth owning, the distribution advantage everyone assumes exists is not there.

### How does il Laboratorio del Gelato make money?

By skipping consumers. Jon is the exclusive supplier to nearly 400 Manhattan restaurants, who buy in gallons and turn the gelato into their own desserts sold all year — which removes the seasonality that defines the rest of the industry. Wholesale grosses $190,000 a month, $2.3 million a year, against $480,000 from the storefront. The average wholesale customer spends $550 a month; the average retail customer spends $12 a visit. He tested a retail-only second location and closed it after it grossed $324,000 a year, and he refuses supermarkets and licensing entirely because he cannot control the freezer temperature once the product leaves his hands.

### Why is ice cream so seasonal, and can that be fixed?

Because demand collapses in winter and the fixed costs do not. Smoove grosses $65,000 a month from May to August and $30,000 in the other eight; Sam's goes from $15,000 to $4,000; il Laboratorio's storefront goes from $70,000 to $25,000. The three fixes in this episode are all the same idea — find a buyer who is not a walk-in. Sam works over a hundred street fairs from April to October, Smoove leans on conventions and catering and opened its second shop in California where the weather cooperates year-round, and il Laboratorio sells to restaurants whose desserts sell in January.

## Discussion

- On paper ice cream is the easiest business in packaged food — frozen, few inputs, proven distribution, zero switching costs. Every conglomerate that owned it has quit. What does the paper version leave out?
- Unilever assembled the largest ice cream business on earth and grew it 4% in twenty years, blaming the weather every one of them. When should an explanation that recurs annually stop being accepted?
- Nestlé's margins improved because it cut the pint from 16 ounces to 14 and charged the same, and then it sold the business for $4 billion. What was the buyer purchasing?
- Zero switching costs mean a good product can take share in a single trip to the freezer aisle. Why has that not produced a durable winner?
- You buy one of these brands from a conglomerate that has given up on it. What can you do that they could not?

## Sources

Divisional revenue, operating margins, and acquisition prices from Unilever, Nestlé, Froneri, Kroger, Dunkin' Brands, and Ben & Jerry's annual reports, filings, and press releases for the years shown; franchise costs and median unit revenues from Franchise Disclosure Documents; store-level revenue, seasonal splits, and operating margins disclosed on camera by the owners of Sam's Fried Ice Cream, Smoove, and il Laboratorio del Gelato

---

From [Modern MBA](https://modern-mba.com/). Read this case in full at [https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream](https://modern-mba.com/case/ice-cream), or watch the episode at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oZuz9AHe9JA.