---
title: "Why the scooter startups all went bankrupt"
url: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters
sector: "Technology"
sector_url: https://modern-mba.com/sector/technology
aired: 2024-11-03
published: 2026-08-27
updated: 2026-08-28
reading_time_minutes: 15
charts: 19
video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=91Oyd7zK1bk
author: "Yishan Lin"
author_url: https://www.linkedin.com/in/yishanlin/
publisher: Modern MBA
license: "© Modern MBA, all rights reserved. Quote and cite with credit and a link; republishing needs written permission."
---

# Why the scooter startups all went bankrupt

Bird became the fastest company in history to reach a $1 billion valuation, scaled from 250 scooters to 98,800 across 400 cities, and filed for bankruptcy five years later. The average scooter grossed about $2,000 a year, cost $1,300 to buy, and $1,000 a year to maintain — it lost money on every vehicle, in every year, at every fleet size. This case study reads Bird's own filings alongside JUMP and Spin to show why micromobility was never a business.

## Key figures

- **1.3** — Rides per Bird scooter per day, against the six it claimed
- **$8.00** — What a ride would have to cost to break even. It costs $4.97
- **3–9%** — Gross margin on selling the scooters themselves

## The argument

The pitch was that scooters would disrupt walking. That is not hindsight — it is what the venture capitalists wrote down. The playbook came from Uber and Airbnb: price below cost so consumers learn you as the cheap option, deploy without asking, settle with the city afterwards. Bird dumped scooters onto Santa Monica in late 2017 and became the fastest company in history to a $1 billion valuation. Uber bought JUMP for $200 million on $17 million of revenue. Ford bought Spin for $100 million.

Underneath it, the asset never worked. Bird claimed six rides per scooter per day; its filings show 2.8, then 2.5, 1.3, 1.6, and 1.3. At a 12-minute average trip that is a vehicle earning for twelve minutes and idle for the rest, while its battery drains and someone collects it overnight. The average scooter grossed $2,521 in 2018 and less every year after, against hardware at $550 to $2,479 and maintenance near $1,000 a year. It lost money on every vehicle, in every year, at every fleet size.

So Bird moved the losses rather than fixing them. Gig chargers, then Fleet Managers — handed 100 scooters free, paid 80% of ride revenue, liable for availability. That is franchising with the franchisee holding the depreciation, and it still only got gross margin to 50%. To break even at actual usage a rider would pay $8.00 a trip against the $4.97 they pay, which is an Uber. The founders and the VCs cashed out at IPO and now work at AI startups. Bird went bankrupt in 2023, and cities function exactly as before.

## Charts

### The playbook they copied, in dollars

Operating income in millions. Uber and Airbnb spent six years teaching consumers they were the cheap option, then raised prices as public companies.

|  | Uber | Airbnb |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2016 | −$3,023M | −$133M |
| 2017 | −$4,080M | −$81M |
| 2018 | −$3,033M | $19M |
| 2019 | −$8,596M | −$501M |
| 2020 | −$4,863M | −$3,590M |
| 2021 | −$3,834M | $429M |
| 2022 | −$1,832M | $1,802M |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why the scooter startups all went bankrupt”, aired November 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#chart-1 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#sources

### And then the prices went up

Average cost of an Airbnb reservation and an Uber trip. Cheap was the acquisition strategy, not the product.

|  | Airbnb reservation | Uber trip |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2017 | $113 | $9 |
| 2018 | $118 | $9 |
| 2019 | $116 | $10 |
| 2020 | $124 | $12 |
| 2021 | $156 | $14 |
| 2022 | $160 | $15 |
| 2023 | $164 | $15 |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why the scooter startups all went bankrupt”, aired November 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#chart-2 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#sources

### Half a billion dollars for no moat at all

Funds raised by each startup in millions of dollars, 2017 to 2019. The scooters were the same generic Chinese model.

|  | US dollars |
| --- | --- |
| Bird 2018 | $550M |
| Lime 2018 | $405M |
| Lime 2019 | $310M |
| Bird 2019 | $275M |
| Skip 2018 | $131M |
| Lime 2017 | $100M |
| Bird 2017 | $15M |
| Spin 2017 | $8M |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why the scooter startups all went bankrupt”, aired November 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#chart-3 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#sources

### Fastest company in history to a billion, and back

Bird valuation in billions of dollars, from launch to year five.

|  | US dollars |
| --- | --- |
| 2017 Launch | $0.0B |
| 2018 Year 1 | $2.0B |
| 2019 Year 2 | $2.5B |
| 2021 IPO | $2.3B |
| 2022 Year 5 | $0.1B |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why the scooter startups all went bankrupt”, aired November 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#chart-4 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#sources

### 250 scooters became 98,800

Number of Bird scooters deployed worldwide, across roughly 400 cities.

|  | Counts |
| --- | --- |
| 2017 Launch | 250 |
| 2018 Year 1 | 23,000 |
| 2019 Year 2 | 44,000 |
| 2020 Year 3 | 38,000 |
| 2021 IPO | 68,600 |
| 2022 Year 5 | 98,800 |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why the scooter startups all went bankrupt”, aired November 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#chart-5 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#sources

### The more they deployed, the less each one was used

Average number of rides per deployed vehicle per day. Bird publicly claimed six. Its filings say otherwise.

|  | Counts |
| --- | --- |
| 2017 Launch | 6.0 |
| 2018 Year 1 | 2.8 |
| 2019 Year 2 | 2.5 |
| 2020 Year 3 | 1.3 |
| 2021 IPO | 1.6 |
| 2022 Year 5 | 1.3 |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why the scooter startups all went bankrupt”, aired November 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#chart-6 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#sources

### Total rides is the number that hides it

Rides taken per year, in millions. It grows with the fleet no matter how badly each vehicle performs.

|  | Counts |
| --- | --- |
| 2017 Launch | 10M |
| 2018 Year 1 | 24M |
| 2019 Year 2 | 40M |
| 2020 Year 3 | 18M |
| 2021 IPO | 40M |
| 2022 Year 5 | 47M |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why the scooter startups all went bankrupt”, aired November 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#chart-7 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#sources

### Five years, and the losses grew

Bird revenue and operating income in millions of dollars.

|  | Revenue | Operating income |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2018 Year 1 | $58M | −$369M |
| 2019 Year 2 | $141M | −$385M |
| 2020 Year 3 | $75M | −$208M |
| 2021 IPO | $173M | −$235M |
| 2022 Year 5 | $231M | −$471M |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why the scooter startups all went bankrupt”, aired November 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#chart-8 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#sources

### Even the number they picked themselves looks bad

Adjusted EBITDA against actual operating income, in millions of dollars. Adjusted EBITDA is the metric a company defines for itself.

|  | Adjusted EBITDA | Operating income |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2018 Year 1 | −$194M | −$369M |
| 2019 Year 2 | −$229M | −$385M |
| 2020 Year 3 | −$182M | −$208M |
| 2021 IPO | −$81M | −$235M |
| 2022 Year 5 | −$62M | −$471M |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why the scooter startups all went bankrupt”, aired November 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#chart-9 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#sources

### The price of a ride doubled and it changed nothing

Average cost of a Bird trip. A 90% increase in five years, into deeper losses.

|  | US dollars |
| --- | --- |
| 2017 Launch | $2.92 |
| 2018 Year 1 | $3.30 |
| 2019 Year 2 | $4.04 |
| 2020 Year 3 | $6.30 |
| 2021 IPO | $6.01 |
| 2022 Year 5 | $6.31 |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why the scooter startups all went bankrupt”, aired November 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#chart-10 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#sources

### Because the customer never paid it

Average cost of a trip split between what the rider paid and what Bird covered. Riders have paid about 80% of the real price since 2018.

|  | Paid by customer | Covered by Bird |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2018 Year 1 | $2.47 | $0.83 |
| 2019 Year 2 | $3.49 | $0.55 |
| 2020 Year 3 | $4.10 | $2.20 |
| 2021 IPO | $4.30 | $1.70 |
| 2022 Year 5 | $4.97 | $1.34 |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why the scooter startups all went bankrupt”, aired November 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#chart-11 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#sources

### Maintenance alone exceeded revenue for three years

Average revenue grossed per scooter against maintenance cost per scooter, in dollars.

|  | Revenue per scooter | Maintenance per scooter |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2018 Year 1 | $2,521 | −$6,759 |
| 2019 Year 2 | $3,218 | −$3,532 |
| 2020 Year 3 | $1,995 | −$1,848 |
| 2021 IPO | $2,522 | −$1,504 |
| 2022 Year 5 | $2,338 | −$1,078 |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why the scooter startups all went bankrupt”, aired November 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#chart-12 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#sources

### And the vehicle itself cost most of the rest

Average revenue per scooter against the cost of the scooter. Generics ran $550 and broke; in-house hardware ran up to $2,479.

|  | Revenue per scooter | Cost of scooter |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2018 Year 1 | $2,521 | −$550 |
| 2019 Year 2 | $3,218 | −$2,331 |
| 2020 Year 3 | $1,995 | −$2,479 |
| 2021 IPO | $2,522 | −$1,357 |
| 2022 Year 5 | $2,338 | −$1,358 |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why the scooter startups all went bankrupt”, aired November 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#chart-13 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#sources

### The hardware never lasted as long as the model said

Best-case projected lifespan against realistic lifespan by model, in months. Bird spent $40 million a year on R&D to get here.

|  | Projected | Realistic |
| --- | --- | --- |
| BirdZero 2018 | 24 mo | 12 mo |
| BirdOne 2019 | 28 mo | 14 mo |
| BirdTwo 2019 | 36 mo | 18 mo |
| BirdThree 2021 | 48 mo | 24 mo |
| Bird S 2021 | 48 mo | 24 mo |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why the scooter startups all went bankrupt”, aired November 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#chart-14 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#sources

### Franchising moved the cost, it did not remove it

Gross margin before and after Fleet Managers, who received 100 scooters free, kept 80% of ride revenue, and took on all liability for availability.

|  | Percentages |
| --- | --- |
| 2018 In-house | −365% |
| 2019 Fleet managers | −96% |
| 2020 Year 3 | 8% |
| 2021 IPO | 40% |
| 2022 Year 5 | 54% |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why the scooter startups all went bankrupt”, aired November 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#chart-15 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#sources

### What a ride would have to cost

Price required at current usage to cover unit costs plus a replacement vehicle, against what riders actually pay and an Uber.

|  | US dollars |
| --- | --- |
| 2022 actual | $4.97 |
| Break-even price | $8.00 |
| Uber | $14.59 |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why the scooter startups all went bankrupt”, aired November 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#chart-16 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#sources

### Even selling the scooters lost money

Gross margin on scooter sales to the public. They could not fold, had no display, were extremely heavy, and only worked with the Bird app.

|  | Percentages |
| --- | --- |
| 2019 Year 2 | −101% |
| 2020 Year 3 | −55% |
| 2021 IPO | 3% |
| 2022 Year 5 | 9% |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why the scooter startups all went bankrupt”, aired November 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#chart-17 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#sources

### $200 million for $17 million of revenue

JUMP revenue and operating income in millions of dollars. Uber bought it in 2018 and sold it to Lime at a loss in 2020.

|  | Revenue | Operating income |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2018 Acquired | $17M | −$50M |
| 2019 | $119M | −$251M |
| 2020 Divested | $35M | −$86M |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why the scooter startups all went bankrupt”, aired November 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#chart-18 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#sources

### The whole class of 2010s tech, in one year

Operating income in 2022, in millions of dollars. Bird was the smallest loss on this chart and the only one that went bankrupt.

|  | US dollars |
| --- | --- |
| Airbnb | $1,802M |
| Bird | −$471M |
| Shopify | −$822M |
| Affirm | −$866M |
| Robinhood | −$1,027M |
| Snap | −$1,395M |
| Uber | −$8,512M |

Source: Modern MBA, “Why the scooter startups all went bankrupt”, aired November 2024. Chart: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#chart-19 · Sources: https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters#sources


## Takeaways

1. The template was already public. **Uber** lost **$3.0B**, **$4.1B**, **$3.0B**, **$8.6B**, **$4.9B**, and **$3.8B** across 2016–2021 to teach people it was cheaper than a taxi, and now an **Airbnb** reservation averages **$164** against **$113** in 2017. Scooter startups copied the losing half.
2. Money arrived faster than sense. **Lime** raised **$100M** then **$405M**, **Bird** **$15M** then **$550M**, **Spin** **$8M**, and **Skip** **$131M** — inside two years, for a product with no moat in software or hardware.
3. **Bird** went from **$0** to a **$2.0B** valuation in one year, **$2.5B** the next, and **$2.3B** at IPO — then **$0.1B** by year five. It was the fastest company in history to $1 billion and it took four years to give all of it back.
4. The fleet scaled like nothing else. **250** scooters in 2017 became **23,000**, **44,000**, **38,000**, **68,600**, and **98,800** across 400 cities — an average of roughly **200 to 250** per city, before counting reserves.
5. And the usage collapsed as it grew. Rides per vehicle per day went **6.0**, **2.8**, **2.5**, **1.3**, **1.6**, **1.3** — falling before COVID and after it. At a 12-minute average trip, the asset is used **twelve minutes a day** and idle for the rest.
6. That number kills the availability argument. If the average scooter is ridden roughly once a day, people are treating it as a one-way, one-off. More scooters cannot fix that, and neither can looser regulation.
7. Ride volume looked healthy the whole time: **10M**, **24M**, **40M**, **18M**, **40M**, **47M**. Total rides is the metric that hides a broken asset, because it grows with the fleet no matter how badly each unit performs.
8. The revenue never followed. **$58M**, **$141M**, **$75M**, **$173M**, **$231M** against operating losses of **−$369M**, **−$385M**, **−$208M**, **−$235M**, **−$471M**. Even Bird's own cherry-picked adjusted EBITDA ran **−$194M** to **−$62M**.
9. Raising the price did not help. The average ride went from **$2.92** to **$6.31** — a **90%** increase in five years — and the losses got bigger, not smaller.
10. Because customers never paid the sticker. Bird subsidized **$20M**, **$22M**, **$40M**, **$69M**, and **$62M** of trip costs, so the rider paid **$2.47** of a $3.30 ride and **$4.97** of a $6.31 one. Customers have covered about **80%** of the true price since 2018 and Bird ate the rest.
11. Per scooter, the business got worse as it matured. Revenue per vehicle went **$2,521**, **$3,218**, **$1,995**, **$2,522**, **$2,338** against maintenance of **$6,759**, **$3,532**, **$1,848**, **$1,504**, and **$1,078**. Maintenance alone exceeded revenue for the first three years.
12. Hardware was a trap in both directions. Generic Chinese scooters cost **$550** and broke constantly; in-house models cost **$2,331**, then **$2,479**, then settled at **$1,357** — and still only lasted **12 to 24 months** against the **24 to 48** Bird projected.
13. So Bird invented a franchise. Fleet Managers got **100** scooters at no cost and kept **80%** of ride revenue while becoming liable for every part of availability. Gross margin went from **−365%** to **−96%**, then **8%**, **40%**, and **54%** — the cost moved, it did not disappear.
14. The break-even is the whole case. At current usage, covering unit costs plus one replacement vehicle requires a rider to pay **$8.00** a trip against the **$4.97** they pay. That is **Uber** pricing at **$14.59**, for a scooter.
15. Even the salvage value was fake. Bird spent **$102M**, **$12M**, **$215M**, and **$89M** a year buying vehicles and **$40M** a year on R&D, then sold scooters to the public at gross margins of **−101%**, **−55%**, **3%**, and **9%** — they could not be folded, had no display, were extremely heavy, and only worked with the Bird app.
16. The buyers learned it too. **Uber** paid **$200M** for **JUMP** on **$17M** of revenue, watched it lose **$251M** on **$119M**, sold it to **Lime** at a loss, and landfilled the bikes. **Ford** paid **$100M** for **Spin** and shut it down in 2022. The founders and VCs cashed out at IPO and now work at AI startups.

## Common questions

### Why did Bird go bankrupt?

Because the asset never paid for itself. The average Bird scooter grossed around $2,000 to $2,500 a year, cost between $550 and $2,479 to buy depending on the model, and cost roughly $1,000 to $1,500 a year to maintain — and lasted 12 to 24 months in practice against the 24 to 48 the company projected. Usage fell from 2.8 rides per vehicle per day to 1.3, which at a 12-minute average trip means the scooter is earning for twelve minutes and idle for the rest of the day while its battery drains and someone has to collect and recharge it. Bird raised prices 90% over five years and lost more money, not less. It was delisted from Nasdaq and filed for bankruptcy in late 2023.

### Why did scooter companies lose money on every ride?

Because the price was set below cost on purpose, and the cost base never came down. Bird committed $20 million to $69 million a year in discounts and promotions, so the average customer paid about 80% of what a trip actually cost — $2.47 of a $3.30 ride in 2018, $4.97 of a $6.31 ride in 2022. The strategy was Uber's: teach consumers the product is cheaper than the bus, then raise prices later. But Bird was never able to commit to either lever. It raised prices to reduce losses while staying too afraid to cut the subsidies, so it got neither the volume nor the margin. To actually break even at reported usage, a rider would have to pay $8.00 a trip.

### How many times a day is a shared scooter actually used?

About once. Bird publicly claimed six rides per scooter per day; its audited filings show 6.0 in the launch year, then 2.8, 2.5, 1.3, 1.6, and 1.3. Anything above two is an outlier. With an average trip of 12 minutes, that means a scooter generates revenue for roughly twelve minutes out of every twenty-four hours. It also tells you the behavior: people use these as opportunistic one-ways rather than routine round trips, which is why deploying more scooters never increased usage per scooter — it just spread the same demand across more assets.

### What was the Fleet Manager model?

Franchising, with the depreciation pushed onto the franchisee. Bird started with in-house operations, moved to gig workers who collected and charged scooters overnight for bonuses, then in 2019 appointed Fleet Managers in each city — handed them 100 scooters at no cost and kept 20% of every ride while the manager kept 80%. In exchange, the Fleet Manager became financially responsible for availability: if the scooters were not rented, nobody earned, and the vehicles were already sunk cost for Bird. It worked as intended — gross margin went from −365% to 54% — but the underlying cost of picking up, charging, and repairing scooters did not go away. It moved to someone with less capital to absorb it.

### Why didn't better scooters fix the economics?

Because durability was never the binding constraint. Bird, Lime, and Spin all launched on the same generic Chinese scooters at around $550 a unit, which broke constantly under public use, weather, and manhandling. Building in-house pushed the cost to $2,331 and then $2,479 before settling around $1,357, with bigger batteries, heavier shock absorbers, and the sidewalk-detection sensors cities began demanding for permits. Bird spent $40 million a year on R&D and $100 million a year on replacement vehicles, and its best model still managed 12 to 24 real months. Riders could not tell the models apart. Even at a perfect lifespan, a vehicle earning $2,000 a year against $1,300 of hardware and $1,000 of maintenance does not clear.

### Did anyone make money in micromobility?

The people who sold. Uber paid $200 million for JUMP when it had $17 million of revenue, held it three years while it lost $251 million on $119 million of revenue, then sold it to Lime at a loss and put the bikes in landfill. Ford paid $100 million for Spin and shut it down in 2022. The venture capitalists who created the category cashed out at IPO, before Bird fell to a penny stock. The founders and executives of these companies now work at AI startups. Bird itself was taken over by Bird Canada, which has exited cities, moved to bikes in Europe, stopped selling scooters, and is trying to make American metros profitable.

## Discussion

- The venture playbook was price below cost, deploy without asking, settle with the city afterwards. It built Uber and Airbnb. Why did the same sequence fail here?
- Bird claimed six rides per scooter per day; the filings show 2.8, then 2.5, 1.3, 1.6. Who was in a position to check the claim before the money went in, and why did nobody?
- Uber paid $200 million for JUMP on $17 million of revenue and Ford paid $100 million for Spin. What were the buyers actually acquiring?
- The pitch was disrupting walking — and that is written down, not hindsight. What should a founder or investor conclude when the addressable market is a thing people already do for free?
- You are handed a scooter company with two years of runway. Is there a version of this that works, and what does it have to stop doing?

## Sources

Bird revenue, operating income, adjusted EBITDA, fleet size, ride volume, rides per vehicle per day, revenue and maintenance per scooter, vehicle purchase expense, R&D spend, subsidy commitments, scooter sales, and gross margins from Bird Global Inc. S-1, 10-K, and quarterly filings for the years shown; JUMP revenue and operating income from Uber Technologies filings and acquisition disclosures; funding rounds and private valuations from company announcements; comparative 2022 operating income and revenue multiples for Uber, Airbnb, Shopify, Affirm, Robinhood, and Snap from company filings; break-even price is Modern MBA's calculation at reported usage covering unit costs plus a replacement vehicle

---

From [Modern MBA](https://modern-mba.com/). Read this case in full at [https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters](https://modern-mba.com/case/scooters), or watch the episode at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=91Oyd7zK1bk.