Modern MBA

Case study — Food & beverage · 14 min read · 5 questions

Why diners never go out of business

The thesis

Diners are the rare American business that has been invincible to change, and the reason is that they never competed on anything change could take away. While the rest of the restaurant industry chased off-premise dining, tight menus and automation, diners kept the 1940s formula — enormous menus, open through the night, pen-and-paper service, and comfort food nobody pretends is good. That is not stubbornness. Customers want Kraft singles, store-bought bread and packet oatmeal, and they want it to cost nothing.

The economics follow from the expectation. Most restaurants build around protein and live or die on commodity prices; diners put carbohydrates at the center, satiate customers cheaply, and insulate themselves from the swings that force everyone else to reprice. Frozen patties, liquid eggs and tubbed soup would end an independent restaurant’s reputation. At a diner they are the product, because value and breadth — not quality — are what the customer came for.

The three chains prove how little strategy matters here. Denny’s has been proactive for a decade and treats franchisees as genuine partners; Cracker Barrel refuses to franchise, cooks with fresh ingredients and spends more on labor than anyone; Dine Brands neglected IHOP for over ten years while extracting royalties, a pancake mix markup and a rent markup from operators it gave no support to. All three land on the same 13% store margin and the same 2-4% growth. A cheap plate of pancakes is a cheap plate of pancakes — and nostalgia is a fragile currency, always worth more in your head than in your stomach.

How do you think about this? 5 strategy questions this case raises and does not answer.
Read the comments, or add yours

The statistics

13%Store-level operating margin at both Denny's and Cracker Barrel
$10.89Average spend per Denny's guest per visit, before tax and tip
9%Total sales growth at the average IHOP across twelve years

By the numbers — swipe or use arrows

01Denny's has stopped opening restaurantsLocations by geography. The US count peaked at 1,610 in 2016 and has fallen every year since; international growth has not covered the difference.
Denny's has stopped opening restaurants — Why diners never go out of business05001,0001,5002,0001,5909820121,59910120131,59610620141,59911120151,61012320161,60712820171,57813120181,55914420191,4451572022UNITED STATESINTERNATIONALModern MBA
View data
Locations by geography
United StatesInternational
20121,59098
20131,599101
20141,596106
20151,599111
20161,610123
20171,607128
20181,578131
20191,559144
20221,445157

Source: Modern MBA, “Why diners never go out of business”, published . Cite this chart · Sources

02The smallest room in full serviceAverage location size in square feet, 2022. A Denny's is roughly half an Olive Garden and barely a third larger than a Chipotle counter.
The smallest room in full service — Why diners never go out of business0 sq ft2,500 sq ft5,000 sq ft7,500 sq ft10,000 sq ft4,400 sq ftDenny's2,580 sq ftChipotle6,000 sq ftOutback7,500 sq ftBJ's7,700 sq ftOlive Garden8,000 sq ftTexas Roadhouse8,500 sq ftRuth's Chris8,750 sq ftCheesecake FactoryModern MBA
View data
Average location size in square feet, 2022
Measures
Denny's4,400 sq ft
Chipotle2,580 sq ft
Outback6,000 sq ft
BJ's7,500 sq ft
Olive Garden7,700 sq ft
Texas Roadhouse8,000 sq ft
Ruth's Chris8,500 sq ft
Cheesecake Factory8,750 sq ft

Source: Modern MBA, “Why diners never go out of business”, published . Cite this chart · Sources

03It is a breakfast and lunch business that never closesShare of customers by time of day. Two thirds of the traffic arrives before dinner, and the overnight hours the brand is known for bring in 17%.
It is a breakfast and lunch business that never closes — Why diners never go out of business0%10%20%30%40%26%Breakfast36%Lunch22%Dinner17%Late nightModern MBA
View data
Share of customers by time of day
Percentages
Breakfast26%
Lunch36%
Dinner22%
Late night17%

Source: Modern MBA, “Why diners never go out of business”, published . Cite this chart · Sources

04The franchisee's restaurant never caught the company'sAnnual sales per location by ownership type. Corporate stores went from $1.8M to $3.0M; the franchises that are 96% of the system went from $1.4M to $1.7M.
The franchisee's restaurant never caught the company's — Why diners never go out of business$0.0M$1.0M$2.0M$3.0M$4.0M$1.8M$1.4M2011$1.9M$1.4M2012$2.0M$1.4M2013$2.1M$1.5M2014$2.2M$1.6M2015$2.3M$1.6M2016$2.3M$1.6M2017$2.3M$1.6M2018$2.5M$1.7M2019$3.0M$1.7M2022CORPORATEFRANCHISEModern MBA
View data
Annual sales per location by ownership type
CorporateFranchise
2011$1.8M$1.4M
2012$1.9M$1.4M
2013$2.0M$1.4M
2014$2.1M$1.5M
2015$2.2M$1.6M
2016$2.3M$1.6M
2017$2.3M$1.6M
2018$2.3M$1.6M
2019$2.5M$1.7M
2022$3.0M$1.7M

Source: Modern MBA, “Why diners never go out of business”, published . Cite this chart · Sources

05Eleven years of proactivity bought 3% a yearAnnual sales per location, ownership blended. $1.61M in 2011 to $2.36M in 2022 — 46% across eleven years, most of it arriving after 2019.
Eleven years of proactivity bought 3% a year — Why diners never go out of business$0M$0.5M$1M$1.5M$2M$2.5M$1.61M2011$1.67M2012$1.72M2013$1.8M2014$1.89M2015$1.91M2016$1.93M2017$1.96M2018$2.07M2019$2.36M2022Modern MBA
View data
Annual sales per location, ownership blended
US dollars
2011$1.61M
2012$1.67M
2013$1.72M
2014$1.8M
2015$1.89M
2016$1.91M
2017$1.93M
2018$1.96M
2019$2.07M
2022$2.36M

Source: Modern MBA, “Why diners never go out of business”, published . Cite this chart · Sources

06The check is the ceilingAverage spend per guest before tax and tip. Denny's cleared $10.89 in 2019 and Cracker Barrel $10.84 — the two chains price within a nickel of each other.
The check is the ceiling — Why diners never go out of business$0.00$5.00$10.00$15.00$10.23$9.692015$10.63$9.952016$10.19$10.142017$10.48$10.382018$10.84$10.892019CRACKER BARRELDENNY'SModern MBA
View data
Average spend per guest before tax and tip
Cracker BarrelDenny's
2015$10.23$9.69
2016$10.63$9.95
2017$10.19$10.14
2018$10.48$10.38
2019$10.84$10.89

Source: Modern MBA, “Why diners never go out of business”, published . Cite this chart · Sources

07Labor is the constraint, not foodFood and labor as a share of sales. Denny's spends 39% on labor against 25% on food, the widest gap of any chain here.
Labor is the constraint, not food — Why diners never go out of business0%10%20%30%40%25%39%Denny's27%38%BJ's25%37%The Cheesecake Factory35%33%Texas Roadhouse30%30%Shake Shack30%26%ChipotleFOOD COSTSLABOR COSTSModern MBA
View data
Food and labor as a share of sales
Food costsLabor costs
Denny's25%39%
BJ's27%38%
The Cheesecake Factory25%37%
Texas Roadhouse35%33%
Shake Shack30%30%
Chipotle30%26%

Source: Modern MBA, “Why diners never go out of business”, published . Cite this chart · Sources

08Every advertising dollar comes back thirty-seven timesSales generated per dollar of advertising. The return sat between $36 and $38 for seven straight years, then jumped to $47 in 2022.
Every advertising dollar comes back thirty-seven times — Why diners never go out of business$0$10$20$30$40$50$372013$372014$382015$372016$362017$362018$382019$472022Modern MBA
View data
Sales generated per dollar of advertising
US dollars
2013$37
2014$37
2015$38
2016$37
2017$36
2018$36
2019$38
2022$47

Source: Modern MBA, “Why diners never go out of business”, published . Cite this chart · Sources

09Cracker Barrel is a shop with a restaurant attachedRevenue by income stream. Retail is a $700M business and about 20% of revenue, and customers walk through it on the way in and on the way out.
Cracker Barrel is a shop with a restaurant attached — Why diners never go out of business$0.00B$1.00B$2.00B$3.00B$4.00B$1.91B$0.49B2010$1.93B$0.50B2011$2.05B$0.53B2012$2.10B$0.54B2013$2.14B$0.55B2014$2.27B$0.57B2015$2.32B$0.59B2016$2.35B$0.58B2017$2.44B$0.58B2018$2.48B$0.59B2019$2.03B$0.49B2020$2.23B$0.59B2021$2.56B$0.70B2022FOOD & DRINKRETAILModern MBA
View data
Revenue by income stream
Food & drinkRetail
2010$1.91B$0.49B
2011$1.93B$0.50B
2012$2.05B$0.53B
2013$2.10B$0.54B
2014$2.14B$0.55B
2015$2.27B$0.57B
2016$2.32B$0.59B
2017$2.35B$0.58B
2018$2.44B$0.58B
2019$2.48B$0.59B
2020$2.03B$0.49B
2021$2.23B$0.59B
2022$2.56B$0.70B

Source: Modern MBA, “Why diners never go out of business”, published . Cite this chart · Sources

10And the shop is where the margin isGross margin on retail merchandise. Around 50% on the rocking chairs and candy, against a restaurant that breaks even on the food.
And the shop is where the margin is — Why diners never go out of business0%20%40%60%51%201551%201652%201752%201851%201949%2022Modern MBA
View data
Gross margin on retail merchandise
Percentages
201551%
201651%
201752%
201852%
201951%
202249%

Source: Modern MBA, “Why diners never go out of business”, published . Cite this chart · Sources

11Opposite strategies, the same store marginRestaurant-level operating margin. One refuses to franchise and cooks fresh, the other franchises 96% of its system. Both land in the same band.
Opposite strategies, the same store margin — Why diners never go out of business0%5%10%15%20%13%16%201213%14%201313%14%201414%16%201515%17%201616%17%201714%15%201814%11%20199%10%2022CRACKER BARRELDENNY'SModern MBA
View data
Restaurant-level operating margin
Cracker BarrelDenny's
201213%16%
201313%14%
201413%14%
201514%16%
201615%17%
201716%17%
201814%15%
201914%11%
20229%10%

Source: Modern MBA, “Why diners never go out of business”, published . Cite this chart · Sources

12Dine Brands takes $200M a year out of IHOPEarnings from royalties, the pancake mix operators must buy daily, and rent on buildings it leases them. Up 4% a year while the restaurants were not.
Dine Brands takes $200M a year out of IHOP — Why diners never go out of business$0M$50M$100M$150M$200M$250M$149M2010$154M2011$159M2012$161M2013$170M2014$184M2015$185M2016$191M2017$199M2018$205M2019$143M2020$190M2021$199M2022Modern MBA
View data
Earnings from royalties, the pancake mix operators must buy daily, and rent on buildings it leases them
US dollars
2010$149M
2011$154M
2012$159M
2013$161M
2014$170M
2015$184M
2016$185M
2017$191M
2018$199M
2019$205M
2020$143M
2021$190M
2022$199M

Source: Modern MBA, “Why diners never go out of business”, published . Cite this chart · Sources

13At an 85% margin on money it does nothing to earnSegment profit margin on the IHOP franchise business. Royalties, the pancake mix and the rent markup clear 80% or better in every year the episode charts.
At an 85% margin on money it does nothing to earn — Why diners never go out of business0%25%50%75%100%82%201083%201182%201285%201387%201688%201787%201887%201979%202089%202185%2022Modern MBA
View data
Segment profit margin on the IHOP franchise business
Percentages
201082%
201183%
201282%
201385%
201687%
201788%
201887%
201987%
202079%
202189%
202285%

Source: Modern MBA, “Why diners never go out of business”, published . Cite this chart · Sources

14The restaurant it was extracted from grew 9% in twelve yearsAnnual gross revenue of the average IHOP. $1.76M in 2010, $1.92M in 2022 — neglect produced the same low single-digit growth as Denny's proactivity.
The restaurant it was extracted from grew 9% in twelve years — Why diners never go out of business$0.00M$0.50M$1.00M$1.50M$2.00M$2.50M$1.76M2010$1.74M2011$1.71M2012$1.76M2013$1.83M2014$1.95M2015$1.97M2016$1.87M2017$1.89M2018$1.90M2019$1.34M2020$1.72M2021$1.92M2022Modern MBA
View data
Annual gross revenue of the average IHOP
US dollars
2010$1.76M
2011$1.74M
2012$1.71M
2013$1.76M
2014$1.83M
2015$1.95M
2016$1.97M
2017$1.87M
2018$1.89M
2019$1.90M
2020$1.34M
2021$1.72M
2022$1.92M

Source: Modern MBA, “Why diners never go out of business”, published . Cite this chart · Sources

01 / 14

Location counts, average unit volumes, daypart mix, franchise fees and royalty rates, labor and food costs as a percentage of sales, advertising spend and advertising efficiency, retail revenue and segment margins from Denny's Corporation, Cracker Barrel Old Country Store and Dine Brands Global annual reports, 10-K filings and franchise disclosure documents, 2010 through 2022; per-guest check averages as last reported by each company

Key takeaways

01

Diners survived by refusing to compete on excellence. While restaurants gravitated to off-premise dining, small menus, originality and automation, diners kept the 1940s formula — huge menus, open 24/7, pen-and-paper service, and no pretense of quality. The customer is not asking for reinvention.

02

The menu is built on carbohydrates on purpose. Most restaurants center on protein and are therefore exposed every time protein prices move. Diners position carbs as the star, satiate customers cheaply, and are structurally insulated from the commodity swings that force other restaurants to reprice.

03

The low expectations are the margin. Frozen premade patties, liquid eggs, tubbed soup, frozen vegetables and packaged desserts would shame an independent restaurant. At a diner they are simply the product, because customers arrive expecting cheap, simple and consistent.

04

Denny's is the oldest diner chain in the world and the most proactive of the three, with over 1,600 locations, 90% of them in the United States, 96% franchised, in freestanding 4,400 sq ft buildings seating 140.

05

Denny's treats franchisees as partners, which is genuinely rare. Every franchisee joins the Denny's Franchisee Association, which runs five committees — Development, Marketing, Operations, Supply Chain and Technology — collaborating directly with corporate. The equivalent bodies at Burger King and KFC are self-organized and carry no official recognition.

06

Denny's sees fast food, not other diners, as its competition — and reacts to it. It only replaced the water in its pancake mix with eggs and buttermilk after McDonald's launched all-day breakfast in 2015, then promoted the result as 50% fluffier.

07

None of the proactivity moved the number. The average Denny's franchise grossed $1.3M in 2010 and $1.7M by 2022; blended across ownership types the average location went from $1.6M in 2011 to $2.3M in 2022 — 46% over eleven years, or 3-4% a year. Locations went from 1,685 in 2011 to roughly 1,600 by 2022.

08

The check is the ceiling. A Denny's guest spent $10.89 in 2019 before tax and tip, well below Olive Garden, the Cheesecake Factory or BJ's Brewhouse. High margins on tiny checks still produce very few dollars.

09

Labor, not food, is the constraint. A single Denny's runs on 50 people across two shifts, and labor has averaged 39% of sales over the past decade against food costs of 25%. The $70-80M advertising warchest returns $47 in sales for every $1 spent.

10

Cracker Barrel rejected franchising outright on the belief that food and service can only be held to standard through control — so it has just 664 restaurants and opened only 69 in twelve years, against Denny's 1,600-plus. 80% sit alongside highways to catch travelers.

11

It is also a retail business wearing a restaurant. Of 8,900 sq ft, 1,900 is shop floor, and customers enter and exit through it. Retail is a $700M business at 50% gross margins, contributing 20% of revenue — a high-margin supplement propping up a low-margin restaurant.

12

And it lands in exactly the same place. Cracker Barrel's store-level operating margin is 13%, identical to Denny'sDenny's inflated by the survivorship bias of its few remaining high-performing corporate stores, Cracker Barrel's propped up by retail. Growth from 2010 to 2019 averaged 2.9% a year.

13

IHOP is the largest diner chain in the world, over 1,700 locations, all franchised or licensed, and it has been neglected for over a decade while Dine Brands was preoccupied with saving Applebee's.

14

Dine Brands extracts from IHOP franchisees three ways — a 4% royalty, a markup on the proprietary pancake mix operators are required to buy daily, and a markup on the rent for buildings it leases them — plus 3.5% of gross sales for advertising. It offers no site selection help, no financing options, and requires everything paid upfront in full.

15

It worked beautifully for the franchisor and barely at all for the franchisee. Dine Brands took nearly $200M a year out of IHOP at over 80% gross margins, growing 4% annually for twelve years — while the average IHOP grossed just $1.9M in 2022 and grew total sales 9% in twelve years. The company stopped reporting average check after 2015, when it was $11.53.

16

The conclusion is the same in all three directions. Proactive investment, refusal to compromise, and outright neglect all produce a 13% store margin and low single-digit growth. Certain businesses are so commoditized that strategy cannot make them grow fast, and nothing can make them die.

Common questions

Why are diners so resistant to change?

Because they never competed on the things change destroys. Diners don't win on originality, quality or innovation — they win on value and breadth, with enormous menus and low prices that set expectations no trend can raise. Customers arrive wanting Kraft singles and packet oatmeal, not artisan bread and third-wave coffee. A business that promised nothing exceptional has nothing to be disrupted out of.

How do diners make money on such low prices?

By making carbohydrates the star of the plate instead of protein. Carbs satiate customers cheaply and are far less volatile than meat, so diners avoid the commodity swings that force other restaurants to reprice. Combine that with frozen premade patties, liquid eggs, tubbed soup and packaged desserts — all acceptable at a diner and unacceptable anywhere else — and the margin holds even at a $10.89 average check.

Which diner chain makes the most money?

Cracker Barrel by a distance — its earnings are roughly seven times Denny's, and the average location grosses nearly $5 million across restaurant and retail against $2.3 million at Denny's and $1.9 million at IHOP. But store-level operating margin at both Cracker Barrel and Denny's is an identical 13%. Cracker Barrel gets there on volume, Denny's on franchise fees.

Why doesn't Cracker Barrel franchise?

Because it believes food quality and service can only be maintained through direct control. The cost of that conviction is scale: 664 restaurants and just 69 new ones in twelve years, against over 1,600 Denny's. The benefit is the highest average unit volume in the category. It also makes the earnings more volatile — as a conventional restaurant operator, Cracker Barrel's operating income dips to single digits in bad years, where Denny's franchise royalties stay stable.

How does Dine Brands make money from IHOP?

Three ways, none of them running restaurants. A 4% royalty on gross sales, a markup on the proprietary pancake mix franchisees are required to buy and use every day, and a markup on the rent for the buildings it leases to them — plus a further 3.5% of gross sales for advertising. It owns no locations, provides no site selection help and no financing. The arrangement returned nearly $200 million a year at over 80% gross margins while the average IHOP grew sales just 9% in twelve years.

Is the diner business dying?

No, and that is the point of the case. Denny's shrank slightly from 1,735 locations before COVID to about 1,600, but all three chains have posted positive sales in nearly every year regardless of how well or badly they were run. What diners cannot do is grow quickly — 2 to 4% a year is the ceiling, because a cheap plate of pancakes, eggs and bacon has a hard limit on what it can be sold for.

Why is labor the biggest cost at a diner?

Because 24-hour service and table service both require bodies, and the food is too cheap to dilute the ratio. A single Denny's runs on about 50 people across two shifts, and labor averages 39% of sales against 25% for food. Cracker Barrel employs over 100 people per location and spends 45% of sales on labor. The check size is what makes those percentages hurt: high labor against an $11 average ticket.

What are Denny's and IHOP's virtual brands?

The Burger Den and The Melt-Down at Denny's, and IHOP's equivalents — existing menu items renamed and listed as separate restaurants on delivery apps to squeeze sales out of slow dinner and late-night shifts. Nothing new is cooked; the customer ordering from a delivery app simply doesn't know they are ordering from a diner.

Discussion

  1. Denny's invested proactively for a decade, Cracker Barrel refused every shortcut, and Dine Brands neglected IHOP outright — and all three landed on the same store margin. What does that say about how much strategy is worth in a commoditized category?

  2. Diners put carbohydrates at the center of the plate specifically to escape protein commodity risk. Where else could a business redesign its product to opt out of an input market rather than hedge it?

  3. Cracker Barrel's restaurant business is low-margin and its 50%-margin retail shop is what makes the numbers work. Is Cracker Barrel a restaurant with a store attached, or a store with a restaurant attached — and does the answer change how you would run it?

  4. Dine Brands extracts royalties, a pancake mix markup and a rent markup from operators it gives no support to, and the franchise still grows. How long can a franchisor take without giving before the model breaks?

  5. The episode ends on nostalgia being worth more in your head than in your stomach. If that is true, what is the actual asset these chains own — and can it be depleted?

Related case studies