Modern MBA

Case study — Food & beverage · 12 min read · 5 questions

Why Crumbl won't last

The thesis

Every cookie brand gets its moment and then loses it. Mrs. Fields went from one store in 1977 to 780 by 1993 and became a mall institution; today the average location grosses less in real terms than it did in 2000 and is usually run by one person, who is the franchisee. Famous Amos and David's Cookies rose in her wake and were crushed by the same recession, retreating to grocery shelves and wholesale, where they remain. The cookie never stops selling. The brand built on top of it always cools.

Crumbl is that story running faster. One store in 2017 to over 1,000 by 2024 on weekly rotating flavours lifted from fashion drops — and the fade has already started. Average store sales are down from $1.77 million to $1.1 million and store operating margin from 30% to 10%, which leaves the average franchisee taking home roughly what a present-day Mrs. Fields owner does.

The difference is who holds the bag this time. Mrs. Fields owned her stores and went down with them. Crumbl was built to franchise from day one: a $50,000 non-refundable fee, royalties raised from 10% to 12% in three years, a 2% admin fee, 12 cents a pound back on chocolate, and 3% on card transactions the processor charges Crumbl 2.37% for — about $32 million a year through an affiliate LLC. Corporate went from $4 million to $152 million while store margins collapsed. Taking fees that hard, that fast, is what a company does when it knows the hype is temporary. The franchisees are not the customers. They are the product.

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The statistics

30% → 10%Crumbl store-level operating margin, 2018 to 2023
$4M → $152MCrumbl corporate revenue over the same five years
$32MCollected a year in supplier rebates and kickbacks

By the numbers — swipe or use arrows

01Nothing in food and beverage has grown like thisCrumbl stores worldwide since founding. One location to over a thousand in seven years.
Nothing in food and beverage has grown like this — Why Crumbl won't last02004006008001,0001,2001201715201855201910020203272021689202297020231,0682024Modern MBA
View data
Value
20171
201815
201955
2020100
2021327
2022689
2023970
20241,068
02Mrs. Fields had good margins from day oneStore-level operating margins around the time of founding. The format was never the problem.
Mrs. Fields had good margins from day one — Why Crumbl won't last0%5%10%15%20%25%21%McDonald's20%Mrs. Fields16%Taco Bell16%Starbucks15%Pizza Hut14%KFCModern MBA
View data
Value
McDonald's21%
Mrs. Fields20%
Taco Bell16%
Starbucks16%
Pizza Hut15%
KFC14%
03You can only charge so much for one cookieAverage gross revenue per store by brand, 2000. Margin was never the constraint — ticket size was.
You can only charge so much for one cookie — Why Crumbl won't last$0$500,000$1,000,000$1,500,000$2,000,000$1,600,000Starbucks$1,393,388McDonald's$944,000Subway$896,000Baskin Robbins$823,000KFC$712,000Pizza Hut$533,617Domino's$353,000Mrs. FieldsModern MBA
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Value
Starbucks$1,600,000
McDonald's$1,393,388
Subway$944,000
Baskin Robbins$896,000
KFC$823,000
Pizza Hut$712,000
Domino's$533,617
Mrs. Fields$353,000
04Twenty-two years and no movementAverage revenue per Mrs. Fields store, not adjusted for inflation. It grosses less today in real terms than in 2000.
Twenty-two years and no movement — Why Crumbl won't last$0K$100K$200K$300K$400K$353K2000$357K2001$321K2002$283K2015$319K2016$342K2018$361K2022Modern MBA
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Value
2000$353K
2001$357K
2002$321K
2015$283K
2016$319K
2018$342K
2022$361K
05And the reported figure flatters itTrue profit per Mrs. Fields store before labor, after rent, supplies and royalties. There is nothing left for payroll.
And the reported figure flatters it — Why Crumbl won't last$0$100,000$200,000$300,000$400,000$361,497Reportedgross$220,513After royalties& supplies$160,513After rentModern MBA
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Value
Reported gross$361,497
After royalties & supplies$220,513
After rent$160,513
06Two completely different businesses, one brandMrs. Fields operating margins, selling cookies against franchising them. This is why the company stopped doing the first.
Two completely different businesses, one brand — Why Crumbl won't last0%25%50%75%100%11%0%19956%69%200512%62%200714%78%201811%81%2019RETAIL & GIFTFRANCHISINGModern MBA
View data
Retail & giftFranchising
199511%0%
20056%69%
200712%62%
201814%78%
201911%81%
07The two who solved ticket sizePrice of a single cookie, 2024. Levain turned a 2-ounce flat cookie into a 6-ounce softball and priced accordingly.
The two who solved ticket size — Why Crumbl won't last$0.00$2.50$5.00$7.50$5.77Levain$4.50Crumbl$3.75Insomnia$3.49Mrs. Fields$2.15Chick-fil-A$1.29Subway$1.20Wendy's$1.19McDonald'sModern MBA
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Value
Levain$5.77
Crumbl$4.50
Insomnia$3.75
Mrs. Fields$3.49
Chick-fil-A$2.15
Subway$1.29
Wendy's$1.20
McDonald's$1.19
08Which produces real revenue per storeAverage revenue per store. Levain has only 17 locations and does not franchise; Insomnia reached 300.
Which produces real revenue per store — Why Crumbl won't last$0$500,000$1,000,000$1,500,000$1,200,000Levain$769,231Insomnia$768,780Auntie Anne's$663,157Cinnabon$420,000Subway$361,497Mrs. FieldsModern MBA
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Value
Levain$1,200,000
Insomnia$769,231
Auntie Anne's$768,780
Cinnabon$663,157
Subway$420,000
Mrs. Fields$361,497
09Crumbl's first years were extraordinaryAverage revenue per Crumbl store. Weekly rotating flavours turned a cookie shop into a destination.
Crumbl's first years were extraordinary — Why Crumbl won't last$0$500,000$1,000,000$1,500,000$2,000,000$698,0002018$1,316,0022019$1,582,0902021$1,769,3392022Modern MBA
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Value
2018$698,000
2019$1,316,002
2021$1,582,090
2022$1,769,339
10Better than running a McDonald'sStore-level operating margins, 2018. This is the number that recruited a thousand franchisees.
Better than running a McDonald's — Why Crumbl won't last0%10%20%30%40%30%Crumbl26%Mrs. Fields24%Taco Bell23%Popeyes21%Burger King16%McDonald'sModern MBA
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Value
Crumbl30%
Mrs. Fields26%
Taco Bell24%
Popeyes23%
Burger King21%
McDonald's16%
11Then the terms tightenedNon-refundable upfront payment required to operate. Crumbl's doubled from $25,000 to $50,000 in two years.
Then the terms tightened — Why Crumbl won't last$0$20,000$40,000$60,000$50,000Crumbl$50,000Burger King$50,000Popeyes$45,000McDonald's$45,000Taco Bell$35,000Mrs. Fields$25,000Pizza Hut$15,000SubwayModern MBA
View data
Value
Crumbl$50,000
Burger King$50,000
Popeyes$50,000
McDonald's$45,000
Taco Bell$45,000
Mrs. Fields$35,000
Pizza Hut$25,000
Subway$15,000
12And the royalty went to the top of the industryPercentage of sales paid to the franchisor as royalties and marketing fees. Crumbl went from 10% to 12% in two years.
And the royalty went to the top of the industry — Why Crumbl won't last0.0%5.0%10.0%15.0%12.5%Subway12.0%Crumbl11.0%Popeyes10.8%Pizza Hut9.8%Taco Bell9.3%McDonald's9.0%Mrs. Fields8.5%Burger KingModern MBA
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Value
Subway12.5%
Crumbl12.0%
Popeyes11.0%
Pizza Hut10.8%
Taco Bell9.8%
McDonald's9.3%
Mrs. Fields9.0%
Burger King8.5%
13Sales came back downAverage annual revenue per Crumbl store. Saturation arrived within five years of the first franchise.
Sales came back down — Why Crumbl won't last$0$500,000$1,000,000$1,500,000$2,000,000$698,0002018$1,316,0022019$1,582,0902021$1,769,3392022$1,100,5362023Modern MBA
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Value
2018$698,000
2019$1,316,002
2021$1,582,090
2022$1,769,339
2023$1,100,536
14The squeeze, line by lineAverage Crumbl gross margin against store-level operating margin. Staff are on minimum wage, so this is markups on supplies.
The squeeze, line by line — Why Crumbl won't last0%25%50%75%60%30%201845%22%201945%18%202142%14%202239%10%2023GROSS MARGINOPERATING MARGINModern MBA
View data
Gross marginOperating margin
201860%30%
201945%22%
202145%18%
202242%14%
202339%10%
15Back where Mrs. Fields already wasAverage net profit take-home per store after rent, supplies and labor.
Back where Mrs. Fields already was — Why Crumbl won't last$0$50,000$100,000$150,000$200,000$250,000$205,000Burger King$160,513Mrs. Fields$150,000McDonald's$114,549Crumbl$65,000Subway$47,554CinnabonModern MBA
View data
Value
Burger King$205,000
Mrs. Fields$160,513
McDonald's$150,000
Crumbl$114,549
Subway$65,000
Cinnabon$47,554
16While corporate went the other wayCrumbl corporate operating margin against the average store's. The franchisees are not the customers of this business.
While corporate went the other way — Why Crumbl won't last0%20%40%60%6%30%201920%22%202048%18%202148%14%202234%10%2023CORPORATE MARGINSTORE-LEVEL MARGINModern MBA
View data
Corporate marginStore-level margin
20196%30%
202020%22%
202148%18%
202248%14%
202334%10%
17The copycats charge the same moneyNon-refundable upfront franchise fee by brand. Comparable fees for far fewer locations and weaker brands.
The copycats charge the same money — Why Crumbl won't last$0$20,000$40,000$60,000$55,000Bang Cookies$50,000Crumbl$49,500Dirty Dough$40,000Chip City$35,000Mrs. Fields$29,500CraveModern MBA
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Value
Bang Cookies$55,000
Crumbl$50,000
Dirty Dough$49,500
Chip City$40,000
Mrs. Fields$35,000
Crave$29,500
18And none of them reach Crumbl's volumeAverage revenue per store based on the most recent franchise disclosures.
And none of them reach Crumbl's volume — Why Crumbl won't last$0$200,000$400,000$600,000$800,000$1,000,000$1,200,000$1,100,536Crumbl$875,000Chip City$855,964Crave$612,754Bang Cookies$461,564Dirty Dough$361,497Mrs. FieldsModern MBA
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Value
Crumbl$1,100,536
Chip City$875,000
Crave$855,964
Bang Cookies$612,754
Dirty Dough$461,564
Mrs. Fields$361,497
19Rent is what kills a cookie businessCookie Good operating margin from home kitchen to rented kitchen to storefront. Margins are highest baking at home.
Rent is what kills a cookie business — Why Crumbl won't last−25%0%25%50%75%20%2008at home58%200953%201014%2011rental14%201217%2014storefront12%201718%201913%2021−1%2023Modern MBA
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Value
2008 at home20%
200958%
201053%
2011 rental14%
201214%
2014 storefront17%
201712%
201918%
202113%
2023−1%
20So one of them refused a lease entirelyBake Some Noise operating margin, home kitchen to Volkswagen bus. Four classic cookies, no storefront, no rotation.
So one of them refused a lease entirely — Why Crumbl won't last0%10%20%30%40%30%2021online launch25%2022pivot from drops20%202335%2024bus launchModern MBA
View data
Value
2021 online launch30%
2022 pivot from drops25%
202320%
2024 bus launch35%
01 / 20

Store counts, revenue per store, gross and operating margins, franchise fees and royalty rates from Crumbl, Mrs. Fields, Insomnia, Chip City, Bang, Dirty Dough and Crave Franchise Disclosure Documents and filings for the years shown; supplier rebate and credit card processing terms quoted from Crumbl's own FDD; store-level revenue and margins disclosed on camera by the owners of Cookie Good and Bake Some Noise; Levain figures are estimates

Key takeaways

01

Mrs. Fields built the format and then proved its ceiling. It went from 1 store in 1977 to 780 by 1993 — and store-level margins at founding were genuinely good, 20% against 21% at McDonald's, 16% at Taco Bell and Starbucks, 15% at Pizza Hut and 14% at KFC.

02

The problem was never margin, it was ticket size. The average Mrs. Fields grossed $353,000 in 2000 against $1,600,000 at Starbucks, $1,393,388 at McDonald's, $944,000 at Subway and $823,000 at KFC. You can only charge so much for one cookie.

03

Twenty-two years later that number has not moved: $353K, $357K, $321K, $283K, $319K, $342K, $361K. The average Mrs. Fields grosses less today in real terms than it did at the turn of the century.

04

And the reported figure flatters it. On $361,497 of gross, an owner keeps $220,513 after royalties and dough costs, then $160,513 after rent — before any payroll. Which is why a Mrs. Fields today is usually staffed by one person, and that person is the franchisee.

05

So the company stopped selling cookies and started selling franchises. Under private equity it bought Pretzel Time, Hot Sam's and TCBY, and profits went from $3M and $5M to $36M, $32M and $29M — earnings shrank while profits quadrupled, because the customer became the franchisee.

06

The margin split says it outright. Selling cookies at retail and by gift tin runs 6% to 14%. Franchising the same product runs 69%, 62%, 78% and 81%. These are two completely different businesses wearing one brand.

07

Levain solved the ticket-size problem instead, by changing the product. It turned a 2-ounce flat cookie into a 6-ounce softball and now charges $5.77 — the highest in the category — grossing roughly $1.2 million per store. But it has only 17 locations, does not franchise, and expanded slowly on purpose to avoid diluting the brand.

08

Insomnia solved it with occasion and location — late-night delivery from college campuses — reaching 300 stores and $769,231 per store. Between them the two proved the format could support a real number, which is the opening Crumbl walked into.

09

Crumbl took both lessons and added a third. Oversized photogenic cookies like Levain, campus first like Insomnia, and then weekly rotating flavours — a page from fashion, where scarcity beats consistency. Limited-time flavours create urgency and repeat visits, and turn a cookie shop into a destination rather than a pit stop.

10

It worked spectacularly at first. Average store revenue went $698,000, $1,316,002, $1,582,090, $1,769,339 — and store-level operating margin hit 30%, higher than Mrs. Fields at 26%, Taco Bell at 24%, Popeyes at 23%, Burger King at 21% and McDonald's at 16%.

11

That performance is what recruited the franchisees: 1, 15, 55, 327, 689, 970, 1,068 stores. Running a Crumbl was cheaper, easier and more profitable than running a McDonald's — and the whole expansion was funded by operators, not by corporate.

12

Then the terms tightened. The non-refundable upfront fee went from $25,000 to $50,000 in two years, level with Burger King, Popeyes and McDonald's and more than triple Subway's $15,000. Royalties went from 10% to 12.0% — above McDonald's at 9.3%, Mrs. Fields at 9.0% and Burger King at 8.5%.

13

The rebates are where it gets specific. Crumbl's own disclosures describe a 2% administrative fee on everything franchisees buy, roughly 12 cents a pound back on chocolate, $4.29 per case rebates, 50 cents a case on cereal and a 1–2% cut on primary food supply — about $32 million a year, collected through an affiliate LLC. Franchisees also pay 3% on card transactions where the processor charges Crumbl 2.37%.

14

The squeeze is visible in the accounts. Average store sales fell from $1,769,339 to $1,100,536, gross margin from 60% to 45%, 42% and 39%, and store operating margin from 30% to 22%, 18%, 14% and 10%. Since most stores run on minimum-wage staff, that drop is markups on supplies rather than overhiring.

15

Which lands the average franchisee back where Mrs. Fields owners already are: net take-home per store of $114,549 at Crumbl against $160,513 at Mrs. Fields, $150,000 at McDonald's, $205,000 at Burger King and $47,554 at Cinnabon. Meanwhile corporate revenue went $4M, $13M, $47M, $140M, $152M, with company margins above 30% while store margins fell to 10%.

16

The independents are the control group. Cookie Good in Santa Monica has run crazy rotating flavours since 2008 — Crumbl before Crumbl — and grew from $26,608 at home to $1,067,791, but its margin fell from 58% baking at home to 1% last year, because rent is what kills this business rather than ingredients or labor. Bake Some Noise answered that by refusing a lease entirely: four classic cookies sold out of a 1972 Volkswagen bus, $210,000 a year at a 35% margin — the same margin Crumbl earns as a franchisor.

Common questions

How does Crumbl make money?

Not from cookies. Corporate revenue comes from franchisees: a $50,000 non-refundable upfront fee, 12% of sales in royalties and marketing, and a large layer of supplier rebates. Crumbl's own franchise disclosures describe a 2% administrative fee on everything franchisees purchase, roughly 12 cents per pound back on chocolate, $4.29 case rebates, 50 cents per case of cereal and a 1–2% cut on primary food supply — about $32 million a year collected through an affiliate LLC. Franchisees also pay 3% on every card transaction while the processor charges Crumbl 2.37%. Corporate revenue went from $4 million in 2019 to $152 million in 2023.

Is owning a Crumbl franchise profitable?

Much less than it was. In 2018 the average store grossed $698,000 at a 30% store-level operating margin — better than McDonald's, Burger King or Taco Bell. By 2023 average sales had fallen to $1,100,536 from a peak of $1,769,339, gross margin had gone from 60% to 39%, and store operating margin from 30% to 10%. Net take-home per store is now about $114,549, against $160,513 for a present-day Mrs. Fields, $150,000 for a McDonald's and $205,000 for a Burger King. The franchisee is going backwards while the franchisor surges.

What happened to Mrs. Fields?

It hit the ceiling every cookie shop hits and then changed business model. It grew from one store in 1977 to 780 by 1993 with genuinely healthy 20% store margins, but the average store only grossed $353,000 — a third of a Starbucks — because you can only charge so much for a single cookie. After a 1990s cash crunch it was taken over by private equity, which bought Pretzel Time, Hot Sam's and TCBY and shifted the company from selling cookies to selling dough and collecting royalties. Earnings shrank and profits quadrupled. Today the average store grosses about $361,000, less in real terms than in 2000, and store count has fallen to roughly 125.

Why do cookie shops struggle to scale?

Because order sizes are small and rent is fixed. Margins are highest baking at home in small batches — Cookie Good ran 58% that way in 2009 and −1% last year with a storefront — and it is the overhead of brick-and-mortar rather than ingredients or labor that kills the economics. That is why bootstrapped mom-and-pops rarely get past one store, why Levain has only 17 locations and does not franchise, and why real profit at scale in this category only ever comes from franchising other people rather than from selling cookies yourself.

How is Crumbl different from Levain or Insomnia?

It combined both and added rotation. Levain changed the product — a 6-ounce cookie that supports a $5.77 price and roughly $1.2 million per store — but stayed at 17 locations to protect the brand. Insomnia changed the occasion, going late-night from college campuses to 300 stores at $769,231 each. Crumbl took the oversized photogenic cookie, the campus start, and then added weekly rotating flavours borrowed from fashion, where scarcity drives retention better than consistency. That turned the shop into a destination rather than a pit stop — and it was designed from day one to franchise.

Are Crumbl's competitors any different?

No, and their fees say so. Chip City, Bang, Dirty Dough and Crave charge upfront franchise fees of $40,000, $55,000, $49,500 and $29,500 against Crumbl's $50,000 — comparable money for significantly fewer locations and weaker brands. They all run weekly rotations, cross-sell whatever fits the space, use drops to drive footfall and push mobile apps. Like Crumbl, they want franchisees buying marked-up ingredients week after week rather than simply paying royalties.

Discussion

  1. Mrs. Fields went from one store to 780 and became a mall institution; today the average location grosses less in real terms than in 2000. Famous Amos and David's retreated to grocery shelves. Why does the cookie keep selling while every brand on top of it cools?

  2. Crumbl ran the same arc faster — one store in 2017 to over 1,000 by 2024 on weekly rotating flavours. Does speed make the ending more likely, or just sooner?

  3. Weekly rotating flavours lifted from fashion drops create urgency. What happens to a business when novelty is the product and novelty is the thing that wears out?

  4. If the pattern is this reliable, why does capital keep funding the next cookie brand? What is being bought?

  5. You own a Crumbl franchise today. What is your exit, and when?

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