Case study — Food & beverage · 12 min read · 5 questions
Why Crumbl won't last
The thesis
Every cookie brand gets its moment and then loses it. Mrs. Fields went from one store in 1977 to 780 by 1993 and became a mall institution; today the average location grosses less in real terms than it did in 2000 and is usually run by one person, who is the franchisee. Famous Amos and David's Cookies rose in her wake and were crushed by the same recession, retreating to grocery shelves and wholesale, where they remain. The cookie never stops selling. The brand built on top of it always cools.
Crumbl is that story running faster. One store in 2017 to over 1,000 by 2024 on weekly rotating flavours lifted from fashion drops — and the fade has already started. Average store sales are down from $1.77 million to $1.1 million and store operating margin from 30% to 10%, which leaves the average franchisee taking home roughly what a present-day Mrs. Fields owner does.
The difference is who holds the bag this time. Mrs. Fields owned her stores and went down with them. Crumbl was built to franchise from day one: a $50,000 non-refundable fee, royalties raised from 10% to 12% in three years, a 2% admin fee, 12 cents a pound back on chocolate, and 3% on card transactions the processor charges Crumbl 2.37% for — about $32 million a year through an affiliate LLC. Corporate went from $4 million to $152 million while store margins collapsed. Taking fees that hard, that fast, is what a company does when it knows the hype is temporary. The franchisees are not the customers. They are the product.
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The statistics
By the numbers — swipe or use arrows
Store counts, revenue per store, gross and operating margins, franchise fees and royalty rates from Crumbl, Mrs. Fields, Insomnia, Chip City, Bang, Dirty Dough and Crave Franchise Disclosure Documents and filings for the years shown; supplier rebate and credit card processing terms quoted from Crumbl's own FDD; store-level revenue and margins disclosed on camera by the owners of Cookie Good and Bake Some Noise; Levain figures are estimates
Key takeaways
Mrs. Fields built the format and then proved its ceiling. It went from 1 store in 1977 to 780 by 1993 — and store-level margins at founding were genuinely good, 20% against 21% at McDonald's, 16% at Taco Bell and Starbucks, 15% at Pizza Hut and 14% at KFC.
The problem was never margin, it was ticket size. The average Mrs. Fields grossed $353,000 in 2000 against $1,600,000 at Starbucks, $1,393,388 at McDonald's, $944,000 at Subway and $823,000 at KFC. You can only charge so much for one cookie.
Twenty-two years later that number has not moved: $353K, $357K, $321K, $283K, $319K, $342K, $361K. The average Mrs. Fields grosses less today in real terms than it did at the turn of the century.
And the reported figure flatters it. On $361,497 of gross, an owner keeps $220,513 after royalties and dough costs, then $160,513 after rent — before any payroll. Which is why a Mrs. Fields today is usually staffed by one person, and that person is the franchisee.
So the company stopped selling cookies and started selling franchises. Under private equity it bought Pretzel Time, Hot Sam's and TCBY, and profits went from −$3M and −$5M to $36M, $32M and $29M — earnings shrank while profits quadrupled, because the customer became the franchisee.
The margin split says it outright. Selling cookies at retail and by gift tin runs 6% to 14%. Franchising the same product runs 69%, 62%, 78% and 81%. These are two completely different businesses wearing one brand.
Levain solved the ticket-size problem instead, by changing the product. It turned a 2-ounce flat cookie into a 6-ounce softball and now charges $5.77 — the highest in the category — grossing roughly $1.2 million per store. But it has only 17 locations, does not franchise, and expanded slowly on purpose to avoid diluting the brand.
Insomnia solved it with occasion and location — late-night delivery from college campuses — reaching 300 stores and $769,231 per store. Between them the two proved the format could support a real number, which is the opening Crumbl walked into.
Crumbl took both lessons and added a third. Oversized photogenic cookies like Levain, campus first like Insomnia, and then weekly rotating flavours — a page from fashion, where scarcity beats consistency. Limited-time flavours create urgency and repeat visits, and turn a cookie shop into a destination rather than a pit stop.
It worked spectacularly at first. Average store revenue went $698,000, $1,316,002, $1,582,090, $1,769,339 — and store-level operating margin hit 30%, higher than Mrs. Fields at 26%, Taco Bell at 24%, Popeyes at 23%, Burger King at 21% and McDonald's at 16%.
That performance is what recruited the franchisees: 1, 15, 55, 327, 689, 970, 1,068 stores. Running a Crumbl was cheaper, easier and more profitable than running a McDonald's — and the whole expansion was funded by operators, not by corporate.
Then the terms tightened. The non-refundable upfront fee went from $25,000 to $50,000 in two years, level with Burger King, Popeyes and McDonald's and more than triple Subway's $15,000. Royalties went from 10% to 12.0% — above McDonald's at 9.3%, Mrs. Fields at 9.0% and Burger King at 8.5%.
The rebates are where it gets specific. Crumbl's own disclosures describe a 2% administrative fee on everything franchisees buy, roughly 12 cents a pound back on chocolate, $4.29 per case rebates, 50 cents a case on cereal and a 1–2% cut on primary food supply — about $32 million a year, collected through an affiliate LLC. Franchisees also pay 3% on card transactions where the processor charges Crumbl 2.37%.
The squeeze is visible in the accounts. Average store sales fell from $1,769,339 to $1,100,536, gross margin from 60% to 45%, 42% and 39%, and store operating margin from 30% to 22%, 18%, 14% and 10%. Since most stores run on minimum-wage staff, that drop is markups on supplies rather than overhiring.
Which lands the average franchisee back where Mrs. Fields owners already are: net take-home per store of $114,549 at Crumbl against $160,513 at Mrs. Fields, $150,000 at McDonald's, $205,000 at Burger King and $47,554 at Cinnabon. Meanwhile corporate revenue went $4M, $13M, $47M, $140M, $152M, with company margins above 30% while store margins fell to 10%.
The independents are the control group. Cookie Good in Santa Monica has run crazy rotating flavours since 2008 — Crumbl before Crumbl — and grew from $26,608 at home to $1,067,791, but its margin fell from 58% baking at home to −1% last year, because rent is what kills this business rather than ingredients or labor. Bake Some Noise answered that by refusing a lease entirely: four classic cookies sold out of a 1972 Volkswagen bus, $210,000 a year at a 35% margin — the same margin Crumbl earns as a franchisor.
Common questions
How does Crumbl make money?
Not from cookies. Corporate revenue comes from franchisees: a $50,000 non-refundable upfront fee, 12% of sales in royalties and marketing, and a large layer of supplier rebates. Crumbl's own franchise disclosures describe a 2% administrative fee on everything franchisees purchase, roughly 12 cents per pound back on chocolate, $4.29 case rebates, 50 cents per case of cereal and a 1–2% cut on primary food supply — about $32 million a year collected through an affiliate LLC. Franchisees also pay 3% on every card transaction while the processor charges Crumbl 2.37%. Corporate revenue went from $4 million in 2019 to $152 million in 2023.
Is owning a Crumbl franchise profitable?
Much less than it was. In 2018 the average store grossed $698,000 at a 30% store-level operating margin — better than McDonald's, Burger King or Taco Bell. By 2023 average sales had fallen to $1,100,536 from a peak of $1,769,339, gross margin had gone from 60% to 39%, and store operating margin from 30% to 10%. Net take-home per store is now about $114,549, against $160,513 for a present-day Mrs. Fields, $150,000 for a McDonald's and $205,000 for a Burger King. The franchisee is going backwards while the franchisor surges.
What happened to Mrs. Fields?
It hit the ceiling every cookie shop hits and then changed business model. It grew from one store in 1977 to 780 by 1993 with genuinely healthy 20% store margins, but the average store only grossed $353,000 — a third of a Starbucks — because you can only charge so much for a single cookie. After a 1990s cash crunch it was taken over by private equity, which bought Pretzel Time, Hot Sam's and TCBY and shifted the company from selling cookies to selling dough and collecting royalties. Earnings shrank and profits quadrupled. Today the average store grosses about $361,000, less in real terms than in 2000, and store count has fallen to roughly 125.
Why do cookie shops struggle to scale?
Because order sizes are small and rent is fixed. Margins are highest baking at home in small batches — Cookie Good ran 58% that way in 2009 and −1% last year with a storefront — and it is the overhead of brick-and-mortar rather than ingredients or labor that kills the economics. That is why bootstrapped mom-and-pops rarely get past one store, why Levain has only 17 locations and does not franchise, and why real profit at scale in this category only ever comes from franchising other people rather than from selling cookies yourself.
How is Crumbl different from Levain or Insomnia?
It combined both and added rotation. Levain changed the product — a 6-ounce cookie that supports a $5.77 price and roughly $1.2 million per store — but stayed at 17 locations to protect the brand. Insomnia changed the occasion, going late-night from college campuses to 300 stores at $769,231 each. Crumbl took the oversized photogenic cookie, the campus start, and then added weekly rotating flavours borrowed from fashion, where scarcity drives retention better than consistency. That turned the shop into a destination rather than a pit stop — and it was designed from day one to franchise.
Are Crumbl's competitors any different?
No, and their fees say so. Chip City, Bang, Dirty Dough and Crave charge upfront franchise fees of $40,000, $55,000, $49,500 and $29,500 against Crumbl's $50,000 — comparable money for significantly fewer locations and weaker brands. They all run weekly rotations, cross-sell whatever fits the space, use drops to drive footfall and push mobile apps. Like Crumbl, they want franchisees buying marked-up ingredients week after week rather than simply paying royalties.
Discussion
Mrs. Fields went from one store to 780 and became a mall institution; today the average location grosses less in real terms than in 2000. Famous Amos and David's retreated to grocery shelves. Why does the cookie keep selling while every brand on top of it cools?
No answers yet — be the firstCrumbl ran the same arc faster — one store in 2017 to over 1,000 by 2024 on weekly rotating flavours. Does speed make the ending more likely, or just sooner?
No answers yet — be the firstWeekly rotating flavours lifted from fashion drops create urgency. What happens to a business when novelty is the product and novelty is the thing that wears out?
No answers yet — be the firstIf the pattern is this reliable, why does capital keep funding the next cookie brand? What is being bought?
No answers yet — be the firstYou own a Crumbl franchise today. What is your exit, and when?
No answers yet — be the first
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