Modern MBA

Case study — Media & entertainment · 9 min read · 5 questions

Why video games launch unfinished

The thesis

Software stopped being a product you own and became a service you rent, and the margins justified it: Adobe sits near 90% gross margin, Facebook 80%, Microsoft 70%. Adobe now makes more from $9.99 a month than it did selling $700 Photoshop licences. What travelled with the model was a development culture — ship fast, fail fast, fix it later — and an industry that adopted the culture more completely than any other was gaming, where live services now carry a permanent stream of season passes, skins and microtransactions.

The quality collapse is not incidental to that, it is licensed by it. Under waterfall, a studio delayed rather than shipped something broken, because a disc could not be patched. Under agile and digital distribution, launching incomplete is survivable — Cyberpunk, Anthem, Battlefield and Halo Infinite all shipped and promised to improve later. The promise is doing real work: it converts a failure into a roadmap.

But the three publishers here prove SaaS is a capability, not a switch. CD Projekt Red refused it, made one of the best games ever, then shipped Cyberpunk and lost 60% of revenue in a year — double Witcher 3's decline. Square Enix diagnosed the problem correctly in 2013, went all-in, and still wrote down $43 million on Hitman and $105 million on Marvel's Avengers. Take-Two did the same thing successfully: it turned GTA V and Red Dead into living products, and by 2021 microtransactions and DLC were 62% of its revenue — more than full game sales. The difference was not the model. It was doing it deliberately.

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The statistics

62%Share of Take-Two revenue from microtransactions and DLC by 2021
$105MWritten down by Square Enix on Marvel's Avengers alone
−96%Avengers Steam players two months after launch

Revenue, video game sales, net income and profit margins from CD Projekt Red, Square Enix Holdings and Take-Two Interactive annual reports and investor communications, 2011 through 2022; development budgets, copies sold and break-even estimates as disclosed by the publishers or reported at the time; Steam concurrent player counts from public platform data; gross margin comparisons from company filings

Key takeaways

01

The economics behind the shift are not subtle. Adobe runs near 90% gross margin, Facebook 80%, Microsoft 70%, Google 60% — and Adobe now earns more from $9.99 a month than it did selling $700 Photoshop licences. Any industry watching those numbers was going to follow.

02

What travelled with the model was a culture. Ship fast, fail fast means products launch before they are ready and are fixed afterward, and anything that can be paywalled is — including features essential to using the service.

03

Games were a moonshot business before this, which is why publishers wanted out. Budgets ran $5M to $50M in the early 2010s, or $30M to $300M including marketing, spent over 2 to 5 years with no revenue until launch and no idea whether it would sell.

04

The development model was the safeguard, and it got replaced. Under waterfall you plan to a distant deadline and ship something stable; delays were common and acceptable. Under agile, work is broken into two-week sprints and shipping anything counts as a win — so launching incomplete became survivable rather than fatal.

05

CD Projekt Red is the control group: a studio that refused all of it. Single-player only, no microtransactions, no annual sequels, and a stated belief that a good game sells for years on its own.

06

It was right, spectacularly, once. Witcher 3 sold 6 million copies in six weeks where Witcher 2 took two years to sell 2.5 million, and 20 million by the end of 2015. Revenue went $30M to $177M — a 600% increase — net income $1M to $76M, and margin 5% to over 40%.

07

The returns justify the whole moonshot model. Witcher 3 cost $81 million and returned 90% in its first year, has passed 50 million copies, and is among the ten best-selling games ever. This is why Activision, EA and Ubisoft keep spending: you miss more than you hit, but one hit moves everything.

08

Then the same studio proved the risk. Cyberpunk 2077 took 8 years and $300 million and launched broken — and was still a commercial success at first, quadrupling revenue from $116M to $486M and taking net income from $40M to $255M.

09

The bill came the year after: revenue and game sales fell over 60% in 2021 — double the decline Witcher 3 saw at the same point. CD Projekt Red then cancelled Cyberpunk's live service entirely and committed to agile. The trust, not the launch, was the loss.

10

The structural problem is the schedule. Shipping two games a decade means you have to get at least one right; get both wrong and the studio is finished. Every extra year in development raises the stakes on an already binary bet.

11

Square Enix diagnosed all of this correctly, in public, in 2013 — after a $100 million loss — naming "an inflexible earnings model and long-term, large-scale development resulting in a low rate of investment turnover" and calling for a move off disc-based earnings.

12

Its 2016 blockbuster slate looked like vindication: game sales up 42% from $860M to $1.2B, net income doubling $75M to $153M. Behind the numbers the lineup was failing. Hitman shipped episodically, sold badly, and Square Enix sold the studio and franchise and wrote down $43 million — later admitting it needed four more years of sales just to break even.

13

Deus Ex: Mankind Divided is the clearest case of monetization applied to a game that could not carry it: microtransactions in a single-player campaign plus a free-to-play mode where players could not even see each other, forced on the studio at short notice. 5.5 years, $55 million, needed 3 million copies to break even, sold 2 million.

14

So Square Enix went all-in, handing its best studios three years and a blank cheque for a Marvel live service. Marvel's Avengers cost $170-190 million, shed 96% of its Steam players within two months — down to about 1,000 concurrent — sold 3 million copies, and produced a $105 million write-down. Going all-in on SaaS is not the same as being good at it.

15

Take-Two is the counterexample, and it started early and small. It tested season passes and virtual currency on middle-tier franchises — Borderlands 2 with 16 DLC releases, NBA 2K13 with the franchise's first virtual currency — before applying anything to its crown jewels.

16

The result is a company that earns more each year from games released a decade ago. Recurrent consumer spending grew about 60% a year from 2014 to 2017, going from 11% of revenue to nearly half, then from $1.3B to $2.1B in 2021 to become 62% of total revenue — the first time it beat full game sales. GTA V made $1 billion in three days on a $265M budget and $6 billion by 2018; the difference from Square Enix is that Take-Two built live services into games that could hold them, rather than bolting them onto games that could not.

Common questions

Why do video games launch unfinished now?

Because digital distribution and agile development made it survivable. Under the old waterfall model a studio planned to a distant deadline and shipped something stable, because a disc could not be patched — delaying was preferable to launching broken. Under agile, work is broken into two-week sprints and shipping anything counts as progress, while patches mean a broken launch can be framed as a roadmap rather than a failure. Cyberpunk 2077, Anthem, Battlefield and Halo Infinite all shipped incomplete with a promise to improve later.

What is a live service game?

A game sold as software-as-a-service rather than a finished product — designed to last indefinitely, updated continuously, and monetized through season passes, skins, battle passes and microtransactions instead of a single $60 purchase. Fortnite, Apex Legends, Warzone and League of Legends are free-to-play examples; GTA Online, Red Dead Online and PUBG charge upfront as well. The economic appeal is obvious: instead of one payment per customer per release, revenue continues for as long as players stay engaged.

How much did Cyberpunk 2077 cost and did it make money?

About $300 million across eight years, and yes — despite the launch. CD Projekt Red's revenue quadrupled from $116 million in 2019 to $486 million in 2020, and net income went from $40 million to $255 million. The damage arrived the following year: 2021 revenue and game sales fell more than 60%, roughly double the decline Witcher 3 experienced at the same point in its life. The company then cancelled Cyberpunk's planned live-service multiplayer entirely.

Why did Marvel's Avengers fail?

It was a full-priced live service that players found repetitive, buggy and short on content, and the audience left almost immediately — Steam concurrent players fell 96% within two months of launch, down to roughly 1,000 and sometimes 500. Square Enix followed the SaaS playbook, releasing free quarterly characters and missions, but nobody was there for them. The game cost an estimated $170–190 million over three years, sold about 3 million copies, and produced a $105 million write-down.

How does Take-Two make money from old games?

By converting them into live services with genuine engagement, then monetizing that engagement. GTA V launched in 2013 and Red Dead Redemption 2 in 2018, and the company still sets revenue records — because GTA Online and Red Dead Online receive continuous free updates, co-op missions and modes that bring players back. By 2021 microtransactions and DLC — what Take-Two calls recurrent consumer spending — reached $2.1 billion, or 62% of total revenue, exceeding full game sales for the first time.

Is SaaS good or bad for video games?

It is a capability, not a switch, and that is the actual lesson from these three companies. Square Enix went all-in and still wrote down $43 million on Hitman and $105 million on Avengers. CD Projekt Red bolted a live service onto an unstable single-player game with no SaaS experience and cancelled it. Take-Two spent years building the muscle on lower-stakes franchises first, and only applied it to games that could support it. If merely adding microtransactions worked, Square Enix and CD Projekt Red would both be in better shape.

Why was Witcher 3 so profitable?

It cost $81 million and returned 90% on that in its first year alone. It sold 6 million copies in six weeks — Witcher 2 had taken two years to reach 2.5 million — and 20 million by the end of 2015, lifting CD Projekt Red's revenue from $30 million to $177 million, a 600% increase, with margins going from 5% to over 40%. It has since passed 50 million copies and remains among the ten best-selling games ever made, which is the studio's own argument that a good game keeps selling without microtransactions.

Why do publishers keep making expensive blockbuster games?

Because the hits are large enough to justify the misses. GTA V cost $265 million and made $1 billion in its first three days — a 280% return in 72 hours — then $6 billion by 2018. Witcher 3 cost $81 million and transformed CD Projekt Red into one of Europe's most valuable studios. Publishers know they will miss more often than they hit, but a single success adds hundreds of millions in revenue and billions in valuation, and can be extended through sequels and DLC for years afterward.

Discussion

  1. Agile made shipping something broken survivable, because the promise of a patch converts a failure into a roadmap. What does a studio lose when delay stops being an option?

  2. CD Projekt Red's model produced one of the best games ever made and one of the worst launches. Is shipping two games a decade a strategy, or a bet no company should be allowed to take twice?

  3. Square Enix identified the exact structural problem in 2013 and still lost money for a decade solving it. What separates a correct diagnosis from a workable plan?

  4. Take-Two tested microtransactions on Borderlands and NBA 2K before touching GTA. Where else does the sequencing of an experiment matter more than the experiment?

  5. Take-Two's CEO argues you must always deliver more than you charge or people stop coming back. Is that a genuine constraint on monetization or a comfortable thing to say while collecting 62% of revenue from it?

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