Modern MBA

Case study — Technology · 12 min read · 5 questions

Why Temu and Wish can't make money

The thesis

What made a $5 item shippable across the Pacific for free was not technology. It was the Universal Postal Union, an 1874 treaty that heavily subsidized mail leaving developing countries for wealthy ones. China kept that classification into the 2010s, so a package from Guangdong to Ohio cost less than the same package from California. The treaty covers items under 4.4 pounds, which is exactly why everything on Wish, AliExpress and Temu is a trinket or a gadget, and why none of them has ever moved into furniture.

Wish built a company on that arbitrage and dressed it as software. It called itself a data-science platform and spent under 5% of revenue on R&D while spending 70–90% on sales and marketing — $1.58 billion in 2018 against $1.73 billion of revenue. It bought customers for $17 to $25 who were worth $10 to $30. Active buyers plateaued around 62 million from 2018 through three consecutive billion-dollar ad years. It lost money every year of its existence.

Then the subsidy went. The US threatened to leave the UPU, rates were reformed, and postage from China jumped roughly 50% overnight. Wish had to become the thing it promised investors it never would: warehouses, logistics, inventory. Gross margin fell from 84% to 29% — below Nike, below Vans — so you would make more money selling branded clothes than running the platform. AliExpress reached the same place and has never profited either; Alibaba carries it at under 6% of revenue. Temu is the same business again. The software platform was never the business. The postage was.

How do you think about this? 5 strategy questions this case raises and does not answer.
Read the comments, or add yours →

The statistics

84% → 29%Wish gross margin once it had to own its own logistics
$25 vs $10Cost to acquire a Wish customer against what one was worth
<6%AliExpress share of Alibaba revenue, against 67% for Tmall

By the numbers — swipe or use arrows

01Every year, more revenue and more lossesWish revenue and operating income in millions of dollars. There was never a profitable year.
Every year, more revenue and more losses — Why Temu and Wish can't make money−$1,000M$0M$1,000M$2,000M$3,000M$144M−$522M2015$445M−$141M2016$1,101M−$147M2017$1,728M−$223M2018$1,901M−$144M2019$2,541M−$631M2020$2,085M−$367M2021$571M−$398M2022REVENUEOPERATING INCOMEModern MBA
View data
RevenueOperating income
2015$144M−$522M
2016$445M−$141M
2017$1,101M−$147M
2018$1,728M−$223M
2019$1,901M−$144M
2020$2,541M−$631M
2021$2,085M−$367M
2022$571M−$398M
02The adjusted numbers were just as badOperating margin against Wish's own adjusted EBITDA margin — the metric a company gets to define for itself.
The adjusted numbers were just as bad — Why Temu and Wish can't make money−400%−300%−200%−100%0%−363%−349%2015−32%−30%2016−13%−12%2017−13%−12%2018−8%−7%2019−25%−9%2020OPERATING MARGINADJUSTED EBITDA MARGINModern MBA
View data
Operating marginAdjusted EBITDA margin
2015−363%−349%
2016−32%−30%
2017−13%−12%
2018−13%−12%
2019−8%−7%
2020−25%−9%
03The marketplace worked. Everything after it did notGross profit against total operating expenses, in millions of dollars.
The marketplace worked. Everything after it did not — Why Temu and Wish can't make money−$2,000M−$1,000M$0M$1,000M$2,000M$66M−$588M2015$314M−$455M2016$896M−$1,043M2017$1,450M−$1,673M2018$1,458M−$1,602M2019GROSS PROFITOPERATING EXPENSESModern MBA
View data
Gross profitOperating expenses
2015$66M−$588M
2016$314M−$455M
2017$896M−$1,043M
2018$1,450M−$1,673M
2019$1,458M−$1,602M
04A data-science company that would not fund data scienceR&D expense against revenue, in millions of dollars. R&D never exceeded 5% of either revenue or operating expenses.
A data-science company that would not fund data science — Why Temu and Wish can't make money$0M$500M$1,000M$1,500M$2,000M$144M$6M2015$445M$10M2016$1,101M$28M2017$1,728M$45M2018$1,901M$74M2019REVENUER&DModern MBA
View data
RevenueR&D
2015$144M$6M
2016$445M$10M
2017$1,101M$28M
2018$1,728M$45M
2019$1,901M$74M
05It funded advertising insteadSales and marketing spend against revenue, in millions of dollars. Between 70% and 96% of every dollar earned went straight back out.
It funded advertising instead — Why Temu and Wish can't make money$0M$500M$1,000M$1,500M$2,000M$144M$560M2015$445M$429M2016$1,101M$989M2017$1,728M$1,576M2018$1,901M$1,463M2019REVENUESALES & MARKETINGModern MBA
View data
RevenueSales & marketing
2015$144M$560M
2016$445M$429M
2017$1,101M$989M
2018$1,728M$1,576M
2019$1,901M$1,463M
06No platform spends like thisSales and marketing as a percentage of total revenue. Airbnb and Uber both sat around 30% over the same years.
No platform spends like this — Why Temu and Wish can't make money0%25%50%75%100%96%12%201790%12%201891%14%2019WISHSPOTIFYModern MBA
View data
WishSpotify
201796%12%
201890%12%
201991%14%
07It cost more to buy a customer than a customer was worthCustomer acquisition cost against customer lifetime value, in dollars. At a 15% commission, a $30 lifetime value is about $50 of spending a year.
It cost more to buy a customer than a customer was worth — Why Temu and Wish can't make money$0.00$10.00$20.00$30.00$40.00$17.31$10.002017$23.44$20.002018$22.58$25.002019$25.00$30.002020ACQUISITION COSTLIFETIME VALUEModern MBA
View data
Acquisition costLifetime value
2017$17.31$10.00
2018$23.44$20.00
2019$22.58$25.00
2020$25.00$30.00
08Three billion-dollar ad years bought nothingAdvertising spend in millions of dollars against active buyers in millions. Buyers plateaued from 2018 and never moved again.
Three billion-dollar ad years bought nothing — Why Temu and Wish can't make money05001,0001,5002,0009005220171,5006420181,4006220191,600642020AD SPEND ($M)ACTIVE BUYERS (M)Modern MBA
View data
Ad spend ($M)Active buyers (M)
201790052
20181,50064
20191,40062
20201,60064
09Active buyers, before the plateauNumber of active buyers in millions — at least one purchase a year. The growth was bought, and it stopped in 2018.
Active buyers, before the plateau — Why Temu and Wish can't make money0M25M50M75M18M201531M201652M201764M201862M201964M2020Modern MBA
View data
Value
201518M
201631M
201752M
201864M
201962M
202064M
10Building the logistics it promised it would never buildAnnual revenue contribution in millions of dollars. Logistics services went from nothing to $743 million — table stakes, arriving years late.
Building the logistics it promised it would never build — Why Temu and Wish can't make money$0M$500M$1,000M$1,500M$2,000M$1,053M$0M2017$1,508M$6M2018$1,473M$137M2019$1,827M$514M2020$1,177M$743M2021$220M$305M2022SALES COMMISSIONLOGISTICS SERVICESModern MBA
View data
Sales commissionLogistics services
2017$1,053M$0M
2018$1,508M$6M
2019$1,473M$137M
2020$1,827M$514M
2021$1,177M$743M
2022$220M$305M
11The margin story died with itGross profit margin. Wish converged on Amazon from above and kept going straight past it.
The margin story died with it — Why Temu and Wish can't make money0%25%50%75%100%77%35%201684%37%201781%40%201871%41%201963%40%202053%42%202129%44%2022WISHAMAZONModern MBA
View data
WishAmazon
201677%35%
201784%37%
201881%40%
201971%41%
202063%40%
202153%42%
202229%44%
12The platform now earns less than the people making the productGross margins of platforms against brands and manufacturers. Hermès runs 68%, adidas 47%, Under Armour 45% and Uber 38% — all of them above the platform.
The platform now earns less than the people making the product — Why Temu and Wish can't make money0%25%50%75%100%82%LVMH73%Airbnb70%eBay67%Canada Goose53%Vans46%Nike44%Amazon29%WishModern MBA
View data
Value
LVMH82%
Airbnb73%
eBay70%
Canada Goose67%
Vans53%
Nike46%
Amazon44%
Wish29%
13Cash at hand, and the burn underneath itCash and equivalents in millions of dollars, with a $280 million credit facility not shown. Free cash flow was −$947M in 2021 and −$473M in 2022.
Cash at hand, and the burn underneath it — Why Temu and Wish can't make money$0M$500M$1,000M$1,500M$2,000M$2,500M$837M2017$722M2018$744M2019$1,965M2020$1,009M2021$506M2022Modern MBA
View data
Value
2017$837M
2018$722M
2019$744M
2020$1,965M
2021$1,009M
2022$506M
14The turnaround CEO's own track recordFoot Locker's direct-to-customer sales in millions of dollars under Vijay Talwar, who ran Wish for nine months and left with $6 million.
The turnaround CEO's own track record — Why Temu and Wish can't make money$0M$500M$1,000M$1,500M$2,000M$2,500M$1,022M2017$1,109M2018$1,225M2019$1,285M2020$2,101M2021$1,929M2022$1,528M2023Modern MBA
View data
Value
2017$1,022M
2018$1,109M
2019$1,225M
2020$1,285M
2021$2,101M
2022$1,929M
2023$1,528M
15Alibaba never needed AliExpress to workShare of Alibaba group revenue. AliExpress has never cleared 6% while Tmall carries the company.
Alibaba never needed AliExpress to work — Why Temu and Wish can't make money0%20%40%60%80%74%6%201869%5%201968%5%202070%5%202169%5%202267%6%2023TMALLALIEXPRESSModern MBA
View data
TmallAliExpress
201874%6%
201969%5%
202068%5%
202170%5%
202269%5%
202367%6%
16Smaller than Wish, and just as unprofitableAliExpress revenue and adjusted EBITDA in billions of dollars, converted from RMB. Same playbook, same decade, same result.
Smaller than Wish, and just as unprofitable — Why Temu and Wish can't make money−$2.5B$0.0B$2.5B$5.0B$7.5B$10.0B$12.5B$6.8B−$0.7B2021$8.5B−$1.2B2022$9.6B−$0.8B2023REVENUEADJUSTED EBITDAModern MBA
View data
RevenueAdjusted EBITDA
2021$6.8B−$0.7B
2022$8.5B−$1.2B
2023$9.6B−$0.8B
17Pinduoduo went from zero to $4.3 billion in four yearsAnnual revenue since founding, in millions of dollars. Whether the number is trustworthy is a separate question.
Pinduoduo went from zero to $4.3 billion in four years — Why Temu and Wish can't make money$0M$1,000M$2,000M$3,000M$4,000M$5,000M$0M2015$71M2016$254M2017$1,835M2018$4,329M2019Modern MBA
View data
Value
2015$0M
2016$71M
2017$254M
2018$1,835M
2019$4,329M
18And that story is what Temu is really fundingPinduoduo's valuation on the American equity markets in billions of dollars, from IPO. No American can use the core app.
And that story is what Temu is really funding — Why Temu and Wish can't make money$0B$50B$100B$150B$200B$250B$24BIPO$25BQ42018$23BQ22019$44BQ42019$100BQ22020$211BQ42020$158BQ22021$73BQ42021$78BQ22022$103BQ42022$91BQ22023$200BQ42023Modern MBA
View data
Value
IPO$24B
Q4 2018$25B
Q2 2019$23B
Q4 2019$44B
Q2 2020$100B
Q4 2020$211B
Q2 2021$158B
Q4 2021$73B
Q2 2022$78B
Q4 2022$103B
Q2 2023$91B
Q4 2023$200B
19Level with Alibaba, four times JDCompany valuation relative to Chinese peers, in billions of dollars. The youngest platform of the three.
Level with Alibaba, four times JD — Why Temu and Wish can't make money$0B$50B$100B$150B$200B$250B$195BAlibaba$194BPinduoduo$46BJD.comModern MBA
View data
Value
Alibaba$195B
Pinduoduo$194B
JD.com$46B
01 / 19

Wish revenue, operating income, gross profit, operating expenses by line, active buyers, advertising spend, adjusted EBITDA and cash position from ContextLogic Inc. S-1 and 10-K filings for the years shown; comparative sales and marketing ratios and gross margins for Amazon, Airbnb, Uber, Spotify and eBay from company filings; brand and manufacturer gross margins from company annual reports; AliExpress and Alibaba segment shares from Alibaba Group annual reports, converted from RMB; Pinduoduo revenue and US-market valuation from company filings and Nasdaq data; cross-border postal rates are Universal Postal Union terminal dues for items under 4.4 pounds

Key takeaways

01

The whole category rests on a treaty from 1874. The Universal Postal Union subsidized mail from developing countries to wealthy ones, China kept that classification into the 2010s, and shipping a parcel from China to the US cost less than shipping it coast to coast inside the US.

02

It only covers parcels under 4.4 pounds, which explains the entire product catalog. Trinkets, gadgets, compact electronics and anything that folds — and no furniture, no appliances, no home decor, on any of these platforms, ever, despite all three having had war chests.

03

Wish grew revenue $144M, $445M, $1,101M, $1,728M, $1,901M, $2,541M and lost money every year: $522M, $141M, $147M, $223M, $144M, $631M. It never had a profitable year in its existence.

04

The self-declared data-science company spent almost nothing on data science. R&D was $6M, $10M, $28M, $45M and $74M against revenue of $144M to $1,901M — under 5% of revenue every year. The founders were engineers. They knew where the returns were not.

05

They were in advertising, and it ate everything. Sales and marketing ran $560M, $429M, $989M, $1,576M and $1,463M70% to 96% of revenue. For every dollar Wish earned, up to 90 cents went straight back out to Facebook, Instagram and YouTube.

06

That is not what platforms do. Sales and marketing was 96%, 90% and 91% of Wish revenue across 2017 to 2019 against 12%, 12% and 14% at Spotify, with Airbnb and Uber both around 30%.

07

Gross profit was never the problem: $66M, $314M, $896M, $1,450M, $1,458M. Operating expenses were $588M, $455M, $1,043M, $1,673M, $1,602M. The marketplace worked. Everything downstream of it did not.

08

The unit economics were inverted from the start. Customer acquisition cost ran $17.31, $23.44, $22.58 and $25.00 while lifetime value ran $10, $20, $25 and $30. At a 15% commission, a $30 lifetime value means a customer spent about $50 a year on the platform.

09

And the spending stopped working. Active buyers went 18M, 31M, 52M, 64M, 62M, 64M — flat from 2018 — while ad spend went $900M, $1,500M, $1,400M and $1,600M. Three consecutive billion-dollar years bought no growth at all.

10

Adjusted EBITDA is the metric a company defines for itself, and Wish's was no better than the audited one: operating margin of 363%, 32%, 13%, 13%, 8%, 25% against adjusted margins of 349%, 30%, 12%, 12%, 7%, 9%. There was nothing left to spin.

11

Then the arbitrage closed. The US threatened to leave the UPU, rates were reformed, and cross-border postage from China rose roughly 50% overnight — from a maximum of $5.41 for a sub-4.4-pound parcel to $10.77, against $11–25 to send the same thing inside the United States.

12

So the software-only platform had to build the thing it said it would never build. Sales commission went $1,053M, $1,508M, $1,473M, $1,827M, $1,177M, $220M while logistics services went from $6M to $743M — table stakes for any marketplace, arriving years late.

13

Owning distribution destroyed the margin story. Wish gross margin fell 84%, 81%, 71%, 63%, 53%, 29% while Amazon climbed 37% to 44%. The disruptor converged on the incumbent from above and kept going.

14

At 29%, Wish now runs a worse gross margin than the manufacturers it was supposed to be disintermediating: 44% at Amazon, 45% at Under Armour, 46% at Nike, 47% at adidas, 53% at Vans, 67% at Canada Goose, 70% at eBay, 73% at Airbnb and 82% at LVMH. Selling branded clothes pays better than running the platform.

15

AliExpress survives only because nobody at Alibaba needs it to work. It has been 5–6% of group revenue since 2018 against 67–74% for Tmall, it ran revenue of $6.8B, $8.5B and $9.6B against adjusted EBITDA of $0.7B, $1.2B and $0.8B, and it has never turned a profit in its life.

16

Temu exists because Pinduoduo needs a growth story for American investors who cannot use its Chinese app. PDD went from $0 revenue in 2015 to $4.3B by 2019 and its US-listed valuation ran $24B, $44B, $100B, $211B, then down to $73B and back to $200B — level with Alibaba at $195B and four times JD.com at $46B.

Common questions

How is Temu so cheap?

Three things stack. The sellers are Chinese manufacturers, wholesalers and distributors operating at a much lower cost base, shipping generic unbranded goods that cost cents to produce. The products are non-essential impulse items with no brand to protect, so quality is whatever clears the price. And the postage is subsidized: the Universal Postal Union has set below-cost cross-border rates for parcels under 4.4 pounds leaving countries classified as developing, which China was until the rates were reformed. That is why the catalog is all small, light, foldable goods and why none of these platforms sells furniture or appliances. On top of that, Temu is deliberately loss-making — Pinduoduo funds it out of a profitable Chinese business to buy a foothold in the US market.

Is Temu profitable?

Not as a standalone business, and it is not designed to be yet. Pinduoduo has said publicly that Temu's financial impact is small and that investors should not expect continued high growth from the core platform, which is precisely why Temu exists — PDD's group-buying model does not translate to the West, its Chinese user base has plateaued at around 880 million, and its US-listed valuation depends on a growth story. Temu's offer of 90-day refunds, 30-day price adjustments, free shipping and two-week delivery costs more than the margin on a $10 order can support. It is subsidized entry, funded by a mature core business, exactly as AliExpress is by Alibaba.

What happened to Wish?

It ran out of the arbitrage it was built on. Wish grew revenue from $144 million in 2015 to $2.5 billion in 2020 and never posted a profitable year, because up to 90 cents of every revenue dollar went to advertising to acquire customers worth $10 to $30 over their lifetime. Active buyers plateaued around 62 million from 2018 despite three straight billion-dollar ad years. When the US forced a reform of Universal Postal Union rates, cross-border postage from China rose about 50% overnight and Wish had to start building warehouses and logistics — which took gross margin from 84% down to 29%. It has gone through three CEOs in two years and now survives on a 30-to-1 reverse split to stay listed on Nasdaq.

Why does AliExpress still exist if Wish failed?

Because Alibaba does not need it to make money. Alibaba's business is B2B wholesale and Tmall, which is 67–74% of revenue; AliExpress has been under 6% since 2018 and has never turned a profit. It targets emerging markets — Russia, Spain, Brazil — where e-commerce and product standards are less developed, rather than competing for low-income households in Amazon's home market. Its roadmap has been identical to Wish's over the same decade: an unregulated marketplace on flat commission that gradually curates, localises, and starts charging merchants for logistics to cut delivery times. It reached the same destination. The difference is that its losses are rounding errors inside a profitable group.

Why isn't a software marketplace automatically a good business?

Because you are compensated for the problems you solve, and a marketplace that refuses logistics, quality control and returns has only solved the easy one. Wish had software-level gross margins of 84% and still lost money, because the hard part — convincing someone with little disposable income to buy a non-essential item, sight unseen, from an unknown seller, with a four-week delivery — had to be bought with advertising every single time. Taking 10–20% commission on a $5 order is a fundamentally different business from taking it on a $50 order, and no amount of volume fixed the ratio. When Wish finally started doing the hard parts, its margins converged on Amazon's and then fell below the brands' entirely.

Was Wish's data-science moat real?

No, and the spending says so. Wish pitched proprietary data science, personalization and network effects as its competitive advantage, then spent under 5% of revenue and no more than 5% of operating expenses on R&D every year — $6 million in 2015 rising to $74 million in 2019 — while spending up to 96% of revenue on advertising. Companies fund what they believe returns. The founders were engineers who knew that recommendation algorithms deliver marginal improvements, not a moat, and that what Wish was actually doing was what Amazon and eBay had already done years earlier. The discovery feed was the dollar-store treasure hunt in software, which is a merchandising choice rather than a technology.

Discussion

  1. Free shipping for a $5 item across the Pacific was not technology — it was an 1874 postal treaty that subsidized mail from developing countries. How much of what gets called disruption is actually a rule nobody had read?

  2. The treaty covers items under 4.4 pounds, which is exactly why everything on Wish, AliExpress and Temu is a trinket and none has moved into furniture. What does it tell you when a company's entire catalog is shaped by a weight limit?

  3. Wish called itself a data-science platform while running an arbitrage. Why do companies reach for the technology framing, and who is it aimed at?

  4. When the subsidy that makes a business viable is a policy, what is the correct discount to apply to its valuation?

  5. You are advising a marketplace built on a regulatory advantage that is about to close. What do you do with the time you have left?

Related case studies